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Executive summary 
 
General economic issues 
Economic growth in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey has stabilised in recent years 
(2003-2006Q2) at the relatively high level of 4.8% (Croatia), 5.5% (Bulgaria), 6.3% 
(Romania) and 7.3% (Turkey). This is, on average, in line with the developments in the New 
Member States (NMS) and much more than in the EU15, which points to a gradual and 
consistent convergence in income levels. There is still a long way to go, however, as the GDP 
per capita in this region amounted to less than half of the EU25 average in 2005: 12-30% in 
current euro or 31-49% in PPP terms.  
The relatively fast GDP growth has recently been driven mostly by investments and – to a 
lesser extent – by levels consumption that are underpinned by steady real wage growth and 
unprecedented expansion of domestic credit. Net exports, on the other hand, have contributed 
negatively to the GDP due to persistent external imbalances – a common feature of the 
transition process. On the production side, all four countries are characterised by higher shares 
of primary sectors (agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting) compared to GDP and lower 
contribution of services (mostly due to less developed public services such as public 
administration and defence, education and health) than is the case in the EU25. However, both 
shares are gradually converging with EU levels. 
Like most NMS in the mid-1990s, the candidate countries now register high current account 
deficits in the range of 6%-12% of GDP, which is expected to rise in recent years. This is 
particularly evident in the fast-growing countries (BG, RO and TR) where the worsening of 
the current account deficit can be linked to the widening of trade deficits, brought about by 
growing imports to meet expanding domestic demand. On the other hand, export performance 
has been good (with double-digit dynamics except for CR in recent years) and potential 
problems related to high current account deficits are alleviated by steadily rising FDI inflows, 
which covered on average more than 75% of the deficits in 2003-2005 (except in Turkey 
where the average coverage in this period was 27%). The CC4 region has also radically 
reoriented its foreign trade towards the EU25 (Turkey has been trading heavily with the EU 
since 1960s) and become more open to foreign trade in general.  
The region seems to have achieved stable inflation rates. Turkey and Romania managed to 
bring annual inflation down from the high double-digit ranges prevailing before 2004 to rates 
of 7-10% in 2005-2006. Both Romania and Turkey adopted inflation targeting recently (in 
August 2005 and January 2006, respectively). However, after the considerable disinflation 
success both countries seem to be stuck just below 10% and cautious monetary policy will be 
needed to bring inflation down further and keep it there in a sustainable manner. Inflation in 
Bulgaria and Croatia has been closer to EU levels over the past few years due to a successful 
stabilisation of the currency – in the strict regime of the currency board (BG) or through open 
market operations aimed at exchange rate stabilisation (CR). 
 
Labour market 
Both activity rates and employment rates in the four countries analysed remain below the 
EU25 average and – with the exception of Romania – also below NMS10 levels. In Turkey 
this is explained by the alarmingly low participation and employment rates of women – 
roughly one third of the male rates and well below half of EU25 and candidate country rates. ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In contrast, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are actually characterised by a lower gender gap in 
economic activity and employment than is the case in the EU25. The dynamics of activity and 
employment rates in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania were determined by major restructuring 
processes resulting in output declines, whereas in Turkey population dynamics played a more 
important role.  
The sectoral structure of employment also requires attention. Turkey and Romania stand out 
with a very large share of the labour force in agriculture, mainly subsistence agricultural 
activities, characterised by very low productivity. The process of labour shifting between 
sectors will necessarily continue in these two countries, but also in Croatia and Bulgaria. This 
will open up opportunities but also create problems and challenges for economic and social 
policies. 
The region as a whole has managed to translate the economic expansion into higher 
employment. Over the last 4-5 years Bulgaria and Croatia saw their unemployment rates 
gradually falling from the very high levels recorded around 2000-2001, similar to the trends in 
the NMS10 group. In contrast, unemployment rates in Romania and Turkey were relatively 
low in the past but more recent periods brought their stabilisation to somewhat higher levels. 
In 2005, harmonised unemployment rates ranged between 7.9% in Romania and above 12% 
in Croatia. Similar trends can be observed in long-term unemployment. Here, the relative 
success of Bulgaria in significantly reducing the long-term unemployment rate could be 
interesting for many of the NMS countries, which saw little progress in this sphere.  
Looking ahead, labour market policies in all candidate countries will be faced with very 
similar challenges to those faced by the NMS: (i) past and ongoing economic restructuring; 
(ii) disincentives to labour market participation (iii) a high tax wedge; (iv) administrative and 
legal barriers to job creation including rigidities on the labour market; and (v) skill 
mismatches. 
 
Demography 
In terms of demographic developments candidate countries fall into two very different groups. 
The population of Turkey (above 72 million at present) is expected to grow by more than 25% 
by 2050, while populations of Croatia (4.4 million), Romania (21.6 million) and Bulgaria (7.7 
million) are expected to fall and the pace of depopulation of the last two is expected to be the 
fastest in Europe – more than 20%.  
Over the last decade or so demographic trends in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania were broadly 
similar to what was typical for NMS countries with the most negative developments in this 
sphere. Fertility declined to very low levels (well below 1.5) and the population has been 
shrinking quite substantially, especially in Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria this was largely 
due to substantial natural decrease, while in Romania the negative migration balance also 
played a significant role. Large migration flows resulting from the Balkan wars in early 1990s 
have had an impact on the population of Croatia. 
In contrast, Turkey stands out among EU and EU candidate countries for its very fast 
population growth over the last 30 years or so. It increased from 40.3 million in 1975, to an 
estimated 71.8 million in 2004 with almost half of the population under the age of 25. This, 
coupled with the expected increase in life expectancy (from low levels), implies a 
continuation of population increase, although on the other hand falling fertility levels indicate 
that the pace of population growth in Turkey is going to slow in the near future.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | iii 
 
Poverty, income inequalities and the social protection system 
Income inequalities in Romania and Croatia are similar to the corresponding levels in 
Germany and France and, among NMSs, in Hungary. In Bulgaria it is below the EU25 
average, close to Scandinavian levels and that of moderately unequal NMSs, such as the 
Czech Republic. Income inequalities in Turkey reflect a dualistic social structure with an 
export-oriented competitive sector, predominantly concentrated in Western regions of the 
country and a less efficient, more informal sector with less value added, in particular in the 
Eastern and South-Eastern regions. One consequence of this deep regional divide is that 
Turkey is the most unequal among the countries considered. It’s Gini coefficient of the 
distribution of household disposable income was 45% in 2003, although inequalities in 
consumption are much smaller: 34%, than income inequalities. This highlights the importance 
of the household economy, and subsistence farming in particular, in the Turkish economy.  
In the three post-transition candidate countries the effectiveness of the social protection 
system, measured by the proportion of people salvaged from poverty, is about the same as in 
the EU25. Social transfers eliminate around 60% of pre-transfer poverty. The corresponding 
figure in Turkey is only 13%. Turkey has indeed the lowest pre-transfer poverty rate among 
the candidate countries but an ineffective social protection system leaves it with the highest 
post-transfer poverty rate in the EU29. 
Social expenditures are higher in Croatia than in the other three candidate countries with a 
level comparable to the average of the current member states. In Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey social protection spending as a percentage of the GDP is about ten percentage points 
lower. The largest difference compared to the EU25 average is in expenditure on non-health 
social protection (COFOG 10). While this figure is still close to 20% in Croatia, although 
decreasing, as in the EU25 countries, in the other three candidate countries it remains around 
10% of GDP.  
The leading cash programme of social protection is pensions. Pension systems have 
undergone reforms in each candidate country in recent years and are likely to be further 
reformed in the coming years, albeit for different reasons. In the three post-transition 
candidate countries the national pay-as-you-go schemes faced severe financial problems due 
to the decreasing participation, the growing informality of the economy, emigration of labour 
(in Bulgaria and Romania) and the decreasing efficiency in the collection of contributions. In 
addition, the population is shrinking in these three countries and rapid ageing in the next 
decades presages future problems as well. The case of Turkey is different since the working-
age population has been growing and is expected to grow further over the coming decades. 
The pension system was still, nevertheless, in deficit due to over-generous options for early 
retirement. 
 
Quality of governance 
Difficulties in the enforceability of property rights and contracts and an inefficient judiciary 
drive up the transaction costs of the economy, which could be a severe obstacle to economic 
growth. Governmental regulatory activity is another important component of this institutional 
environment. If business creation is overregulated entrepreneurs will choose to operate in the 
informal economy. Since informal assets cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans, the 
likely result is slower growth. This affects poor people the most since they lack the formal 
assets necessary to obtain credits. The quality of governance in the four candidate countries, 
measured by the World Bank’s project on monitoring governance is considerably poorer than iv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
the unweighted average of either the eight new Central European member states or the EU15 
countries. Romania has the lowest scores in three of the four relevant indicators (rule of law, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption); regulatory quality is rated slightly better 
than in Turkey. Indeed, Romania performs below the world average in all four dimensions, 
whereas Turkey is usually around the world average except in control of corruption. Bulgaria 
and Croatia are closer to the NMS8 average (Croatia in government effectiveness, Bulgaria in 
regulatory quality).  
 
From human capital training to employment 
An effective system of education and training is important for several social and economic 
reasons. Among a wide range of objectives for education policy, the preparation of people for 
active involvement in social and economic life, in particular through employment, is of 
special relevance. Education levels, or more generally the skills attained, are among the key 
determinants of individuals’ success in the labour market. On the macroeconomic level the 
ability of the labour force to adjust the skills to the emerging challenges is vitally important 
for the smooth management of structural changes in the economy. 
Rapid transformation of labour markets and the labour force of candidate countries takes 
place in an environment where the average education level of the labour force, and perhaps 
more importantly the quality of education and the extent to which skills are up-to-date, is 
somewhat lower than in advanced EU economies (there are big differences between candidate 
countries in this respect, too). One consequence of this may be that the convergence process 
involves high social costs, such as high unemployment rates among unskilled groups and 
increasing skill-related wage dispersion. Another result may be that the catch-up process itself 
is hindered, e.g. when public pressure persuades governments to try and protect unproductive 
jobs.  
Education and training is an important part of the solution to the difficult labour market issues 
of low employment in certain social groups, hidden unemployment in agriculture, high long-
term unemployment, high unemployment of the youth, etc. The education system should 
provide young people with skills matching the needs of modern, internationally competitive 
economies. The workers in the mid and later stages of their careers should be offered a wide 
range of possibilities to update and improve their skills. This last task requires a well-
functioning system continuous education (formal and informal) and a culture of life long 
learning. 
The education systems in all four candidate countries have undergone substantial changes 
over the last decade or so, but the starting points were very different. By now, all countries 
have achieved universal coverage of education at primary level, but in Turkey this 
achievement is relatively new. Depending on the measure, applied the educational attainment 
of the working age population is below or on a par with EU average (with the exception of 
Turkey, where it is much lower). 
The key challenges for the education and training system are participation rates at various 
stages of education, and in particular the problem of low participation of certain groups that 
on average perform worse in the labour market and may be more often at risk of social 
exclusion. The second major set of issues relates to the quality of education. The problem here 
is in ensuring that the skills that the graduates of both vocational and general streams are 
equipped with match the rapidly changing labour demands and that people already active in 
the labour market can get support in updating or learning new skills. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | v 
 
In Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria numerous groups of the population show very low level 
participation rates in education (even at the primary level), much below national averages. 
This applies to the Roma minority in Romania and Bulgaria and girls from poor families, 
particularly in South-Eastern Turkey. In addition, the education systems of the candidate 
countries are not always successful in providing adequate services to disabled people (in all 
countries) or to the small Roma minority in Croatia (similar problems can be observed in 
many EU countries). While improvement in educational provision for these and similar 
groups is certainly difficult to achieve; a substantial part of the problem is also on the demand 
side for education among disadvantaged groups, it is evident that substantial and quick 
progress is a necessary precondition for improving the social status of these groups, limiting 
the incidence of poverty and avoiding the trap of inherited social exclusion. 
Assessing the quality of education is far from trivial, especially from an international 
perspective. Proof of the quality of the system can be seen in the relative success of graduates 
from various educational institutions on the labour market. Here the experience of the 
candidate countries is mixed; the prevalence of high unemployment rates of young people just 
entering the labour market suggests problems but data interpretation is not straightforward. 
International comparisons of educational outcomes perhaps remain the most reliable source. 
The outcomes of candidate countries appear to be below EU averages (in some cases – 
particularly in Turkey – substantially below), but the comparison is complicated by 
insufficient data and a mixed picture. 
Candidate countries’ achievements in continuous education are unsatisfactory as the 
proportions of the adult population participating in life-long learning are far below EU and 
NMS averages. Moreover, participation rates in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania also appear to 
be much more concentrated on the youngest cohorts than in the EU countries. Despite the fact 
that these are mainly older strata of the population who suffer from the skills mismatch due to 
rapid technological change and economic restructuring, they do not appear to be expressing 
any demand for training, or there is simply no offer suitable for older workers. In practice, 
people over 35 years of age (in Croatia perhaps 45 years) did not undergo any training at all 
as of early 2005. 
 
Regional disparities and the social protection system 
Neoclassical growth theory predicts convergence, in the long run, of countries and regions on 
the basis of the nature of technology as a public good. The main driving force behind this 
reduction in productivity gaps is capital accumulation. By contrast, the theory of endogenous 
growth emphasises the private or local nature of technology, which is entrenched in 
cooperative networks of economic actors such as firms or other types of economic 
organisations. Accordingly, diffusion of technology depends also on factors other than capital 
accumulation; regional or national disparities are not bound to decrease, but they can be 
maintained or even increase if less developed regions are unable to absorb higher productivity 
technologies. The Third Progress Report on Cohesion by the European Commission (2005) 
found that output disparities decreased across member states, but increased across regions. 
Effects of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds are not self-evident on the regional level. 
The four candidate countries differ in their regional patterns and dynamics. Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Romania are strongly capital-centred but in Turkey neither Ankara, the administrative 
capital, nor Istanbul, the financial, economic and cultural centre are the richest regions. In the 
three smaller candidate countries the rural-urban divide is deeper than regional disparities. In vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Turkey, by contrast, there is a wide development gap between its Western and Eastern 
regions. Subsistence farming is an important substitute for the social protection system in 
Romania and in particular in Turkey but it is also present in Bulgaria. 
The level of centralisation in the social protection system and its ability to mitigate regional 
disparities vary across the candidate countries. 
In Bulgaria, the social assistance system was decentralised at the beginning of the transition. 
However, underfinanced local authorities with administrations unprepared for the job were 
frequently unable to provide even basic services so that the system was recentralised between 
1998 and 2001. By international comparison poverty alleviation relies heavily on the pension 
system whilst the effectiveness of the social assistance system, which applies means tests and 
targets poverty directly, is rather limited. Neither the pension system, which is, by its nature, a 
national programme, nor the social assistance system give much discretion to the regional 
directorates or local directorates. 
In Croatia, the recent World Bank study on poverty found that the tax-transfer system 
effectively redistributes income across regions in favour of the poorer areas. Cash transfers 
are still largely centralised, except for housing and fuel allowances, which are county and 
city-financed. In 2002, the social assistance system was partly decentralised so that financing 
and maintaining some of the in-kind services, such as old people’s homes and care centres, 
was delegated to local governments. In addition, local governments may also top up other 
social assistance programme or establish their own programmes.  
The Romanian social assistance system has a highly fragmented structure with a large number 
of small programmes and overlapping responsibilities of various central agencies. The 
distribution of resources and responsibilities among central and local authorities is opaque and 
frequently based on informal processes. The local administrations are discouraged from 
raising their own revenues and the allocation criteria of central tax revenues by the principle 
of ‘territorial solidarity’ are frequently unclear and deliberately ignored. This creates fertile 
ground for cronyism and political migration toward parties winning general elections.  
In Turkey, regional disparities are not only present but they did not decrease over time in 
recent decades. Despite the Priority Provinces Development scheme of the government, 
which aimed at decreasing cross-provincial discrepancies, priority provinces did not grow 
faster than core-developed provinces in the last two decades. The backbone of the social 
assistance system is the Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (SYDTF, by 
its Turkish acronym), which advises and finances the provincial and sub-provincial Social 
Solidarity Foundations (SYDVs). The SYDVs are separate legal entities, independent of the 
SYDTF. The Board of Trustees of the SYDVs have extensive discretion in devising the local 
assistance program and define who is in need and who is not in their respective region. 
 
The informal economy and the social protection system 
Based on the ILO (2002) approach we differentiate between two main sectors in the informal 
economy, the enterprise sector and the household sector, although the borderline between the 
two sectors can at times be blurred. Both are unreported and unaccounted for but they differ in 
many other respects. The enterprise sector informal economy consists of market-based 
production of goods and services, similar to transactions of the formal economy, but unlike 
the latter it remains undetected in calculations of the official GDP. In the household sector 
informal economy economic activities, most notably subsistence farming, are organised BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | vii 
 
within the household or the extended kinship. The extent of the enterprise sector in the 
informal economy strongly and negatively correlates with the quality of governance of the 
economy. Informality of property rights, weak performance of the judicial system, excessive 
regulation of the economy and high taxes are all boosts to for the informal economy.  
Informal employment is also characterised by atypical employment settings, such as seasonal 
or temporary employment, self-employment and other similar forms. Coverage of workers by 
social protection under such arrangements is limited. Employees of the informal sector have 
restricted access to public health care, social security pensions and unemployment protection. 
Such lack of coverage, while perhaps controlling so certain negative incentive effects of the 
social protection system on savings, labour supply and fertility, leaves employees of the 
informal sector unprotected. These people face poverty in old age and a severe fall in living 
standards in the case of job loss or illness.  
Household labour does not accrue eligibility in social security so old age security and 
insurance against other contingencies can only be provided by the extended family or kinship 
network. Such networks can function well as substitutes for social protection but still fall 
behind in efficiency due to the limited risk pool. The seamy side of social protection based on 
the extended family, the kinship or the local community is a level of fertility that undermines 
investments in the human capital of children and threatens economies with overpopulation. 
Due to their large subsistence farming sector, Romania and Turkey have a much higher share 
of these workers employed under non-regular conditions than Bulgaria and Croatia. This is 
reflected in the institutional history of their pension systems. The candidate countries have a 
limited tradition of occupational pension schemes. This is frequent in countries where 
legislation initiated much of the pension system rather than the other way around, such as in 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, where it was employers who set up 
pension schemes first and legislation only regulated the schemes already established later. In 
the former group of countries the typical way is forming a pension scheme first for civil 
servants then a separate scheme for blue-collar workers and finally, a third for the self-
employed and/or farmers. In some cases the self-employed urban population belongs to the 
scheme of blue-collar workers, in other cases they share a scheme with farmers. Usually, civil 
servant schemes offer more favourable conditions than blue-collar schemes. Farmers’ 
schemes frequently face major difficulties in collecting revenues and depend on government 
transfers; these schemes often pay the lowest pensions. The general tendency is the 
integration of these schemes with the exception of some professions such as the armed forces. 
The speed of integration depends largely on developments in agriculture, most notably the 
speed of industrialisation, urbanisation and the extent of subsistence farming.  
Among the candidate countries Bulgaria has the lowest rate of non-regular employment in the 
labour market and this is the country that went through the integration process first, 
completing it by 1975. Croatia had three separate schemes, those of the employees, the self-
employed and the farmers, until 1998. In Romania the funds of the employees were merged 
with the farmers’ fund between 1998 and 2001. The social security administration still keeps 
providing separate data, which reveal that benefits paid by the farmers’ fund is significantly 
lower than the benefits in the employees’ fund. The government struggled through the 1990s 
to feed the farmers scheme. Before the merger only a marginal share of the revenues were 
raised from contributions of the farmers. Romania has a large self-employed population, 
mainly in agriculture, characterised by low coverage, extensive contribution avoidance, poor 
benefits and difficulties in access to other chapters of social security, such as health care. In 
Turkey nearly half of the employed work under non-regular conditions. The administration of viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
the three social security funds, those of the civil servants, the blue-collars and the self-
employed and farmers will be unified in 2007. 
The labour market parameters also strongly correlate with the collection of contributions. The 
two candidate countries with low rates of non-regular employment, Bulgaria and Croatia have 
higher rates of active contribution, 75% and over 90%, respectively. In contrast the two 
countries with extensive subsistence farming and non-regular employment see their 
corresponding rate at around 50%. The data even reveal that urban self-employment, although 
it makes the collection of contributions difficult, is easier to accommodate with contributions 
to the social protection system than rural self-employment and other forms of non-regular 
employment. Whereas in Bulgaria and Croatia the self-employed are about 50% 
underrepresented among the contributors (7 and 10%, respectively, of the self-employed 
among the active contributors against 14 and 21%, respectively of the self-employed among 
the employed), the self-employed in Romania hardly contribute to the social protection 
system at all. 
Despite certain similarities on the surface, in the relative prevalence of subsistence agriculture 
and the lack of coverage by the social protection system institutions, the Romanian and the 
Turkish cases differ. In Romania, subsistence farming saw its revival in the last decade after a 
shock hit the labour market and the government proved unable to build up the necessary 
institutions of the social protection system, including the unemployment services that were 
missing in a centrally-planned economy of nearly full employment. Alternative social 
institutions such as extensive family or local community networks are rare. In contrast, that 
part of the Turkish society that has weak links to the labour market and is not properly 
covered by the social protection system had its time to build up its alternative institutional 
system such as the hemsehri (hometown organisations). The hemsehri are associations and 
foundations regrouping people from the same place (district, village, town, county, region) as 
well as migrants from the ‘Turkish World’, mainly the Balkans and the Caucasus. The 
emergence of hemsehri is linked to the migratory influxes created by rural to urban migration, 
and, since the 1960s, by immigration from the ‘Turkish world’. The hemsehri appeared in the 
1940 and have grown incessantly since then, even more so since the 1990s.  
 
The state of ethnic and religious minorities  
Ethnic and religious diversity is an asset to a society provided the chances of individuals to 
live a full life are not affected by their ethnic or religious backgrounds. However, if social 
disadvantages coincide with ethnicity or religious tensions, disintegration may threaten the 
development of the society in question. The four candidate countries face various ethnic and 
religious minority issues. In Romania and Bulgaria, the Roma are among the largest and most 
disadvantaged minority groups. Bulgaria has another, though less grave issue: the Muslim 
minority and in particular the Turkish minority. Fewer data are available on Turkey. However 
a number of sizeable and relevant minorities are living in Turkey, the most important minority 
issue being the social, political and legal status of the Kurds.  
According to expert estimations the number of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and in South-Eastern Europe (SEE) reaches or even exceeds 5 million (excluding 
Turkey where data are not available). The largest Roma population in CEE and SEE can be 
found in Romania, where the most reliable expert estimations put their number between 1.5-
2.0 million, which is 7-9% of the total population. In Bulgaria, expert estimates put their 
number to 550–800 thousand or about 10% of the population.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | ix 
 
The Roma fall far behind the respective national majorities in many aspects of everyday life. 
In spheres such as education, living conditions, housing, income, employment status, poverty, 
or access to services, they fare significantly worse than the majority population in general, or 
non-Roma neighbours living in close proximity to the Roma. In these three countries the 
Romany differ from the majority in the main demographic trends along several basic 
indicators such as birth rates (higher than average), timing of marriage (earlier than the 
average), family structure (larger families and households) and age profile (lower rates of 
Roma among older age groups and higher rates among younger age groups).  
The level of education of the Roma is low compared to the EU25 average in general, to the 
majority population of the candidate countries or to the majority population living in close 
proximity. As regards living conditions, about half of Roma people in Bulgaria and two-thirds 
of them in Romania live below the income based absolute poverty line of USD 4.30 at PPP 
per day per capita, while the rate of poor non-Roma living in the neighbourhoods of the Roma 
is much lower (6% in Bulgaria and 20% in Romania).  
As regards other minority issues in the candidate countries, an estimated 15–20% of the 
Turkish population belongs to some ethnic or religious minority. These minorities can be 
broken down into various sub-groups by further ethnic, religious, linguistic or other 
dimensions and there are also overlaps between the communities, thus a part of the Turkish 
society can be considered as a mosaic of different identities. The most relevant minority issue, 
nevertheless, is the political, legal and social status of the Kurds due to their share in the entire 
population, mostly in less developed Eastern and South-Eastern regions, the lack of political 
stability and security and the low level of integration. Official data or estimations on Kurds is 
not available; the wide range of expert estimations that can be found occasionally appear 
contradictory.  
The Muslim population of Bulgaria constitutes a sizeable but heterogeneous group, including 
several ethnic or national minorities besides Pomaks such as Turks, Gypsies and Tatars. 
These mostly Sunni Muslim groups have been living in Bulgaria for centuries. During the 
cold war, in the 1960s and 1970s Bulgarian Muslims were forced to take Bulgarian names. 
The largest group among them are the Turks. A sizeable part of the Turkish minority 
emigrated to Turkey during the second half of the 1980s, as a result of their political, legal 
and social situation.  
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Introduction 
The consortium was composed of TARKI Social Research Institute (Hungary), CASE – 
Center for Social and Economic Research (Poland) and CEPS - Centre for European Policy 
Studies (Belgium), which was awarded a contract by the European Commission to analyse the 
socio-economic developments and the process of structural reforms in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania and Turkey, the four candidate countries at the time the call for tenders was issued. 
The objective was to identify major challenges in the current demographic, social and 
economic context which could be considered relevant in determining the capacity of the 
candidate countries to function in the Union.  
Our Proposal was submitted to the Commission on June 27, 2005. The contract came into 
effect on November 30, 2005. On February 8, 2006 consortium members and Commission 
representatives met in Brussels for a kick-off meeting and on September 29, 2006 to discuss 
the first results of the project. 
The outputs of the project, specified in the contract, are four country studies and a synthesis 
report meeting the following criteria: 
•  The four country studies for, respectively, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey on the 
social dimension take into account the demographic, social and economic context. The 
call for tenders explicitly required “[c]omprehensive harmonised quantitative 
information” in the four country studies. In order to guarantee standardised content we 
provided the teams working on the country studies with a detailed template describing the 
uniform content of each subsection and a methodological yardstick including the 
specification of indicators to be applied. The template was presented to the Commission in 
the Inception Report of this project submitted in March 2006. 
•  In addition, the call for tender specifically required a joint Statistical Annex following the 
format of the 2004 Social Situation Report. 
•  The synthesis report presents a comprehensive overview of the social situation in the four 
countries with a comparative focus addressing key problems in the light of possible 
accession to the EU. The kick-off meeting gave an opportunity to further specify the 
issues of special interest such as:  
-  human capital investments in relation to employment, 
-  regional disparities, in particular the functioning of centralised versus decentralised 
social protection, 
-  the interrelation between the informal economy and the social protection system, and 
-  the state of ethnic and religious minorities. 
The special issues are interrelated. In the context of the candidate countries the functioning of 
centralised versus decentralised social protection is particularly important. There are 
remarkable regional differences in some candidate countries. A one-size-fits-all type of social 
protection system is dysfunctional in such a case. However, the good performance of a 
decentralised system requires highly efficient governance in general. Another such 
interrelation is to be found between the informal economy and the social protection system. In 
some candidate countries a significant part of society, mainly in rural areas, does not appear in 
the formal labour market. They, frequently the most vulnerable members of society, are not 
covered by the social protection system either. Finally, social exclusion can also have an 
ethnic or religious background, which can be particularly dangerous for long-term social 
stability. 
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The first chapter of the synthesis report contains some of the most important results on the 
social dimension of the candidate countries in a comparative context, covering general macro-
economic trends, the labour market, demography, poverty, the social protection system and 
the quality of governance. The second chapter looks at the special issues listed above. 
 
 
1. A comparative view of the social dimension in selected Balkan countries 
1.1. General economic issues 
Economic growth in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey has stabilised in recent years 
(2003-2006Q2) at the relatively high level of 4.8% (Croatia), 5.5% (Bulgaria), 6.3% 
(Romania) and 7.3% (Turkey) – see Figure 1. This is, on average, in line with the 
developments in the NMS and is much higher than in the EU15, which points to a gradual and 
consistent convergence with EU25 levels. There is still a long way to go, however, as the 
GDP per capita in this region amounted to less than half of that in the EU25 in 2005: 12-30%
1 
in current euro or 31-49%
2 in PPP terms.   
The relatively fast GDP growth has recently been driven mostly by investments. In particular, 
Bulgaria and Turkey as well as – to a lesser extent – Romania have registered high, double-
digit investment growth rates (19% in BG, 24% in TR and 13% in RO in 2005). The 
dynamics of investments in Croatia were disappointing in 2003-2004 (after a surge in 2002) 
but seem to be picking up in recent quarters, giving rise to expectations of a similarly large 
contribution of investments to GDP growth. It is important to point out that the share of 
investment (gross capital formation) in GDP in CC4 has been rising steadily in the past 
decade to reach 25.7% (on average) in 2005
3 compared to 23.6% for NMS8 and 20.1% for 
EU15 where the share has been stagnant for years.   
The strong consumption dynamics (from 6.1% (BG) to 16.7% (CR) during 2003-2005) was 
still somewhat weaker than the dynamics of investments. External imbalances have become a 
persistent feature of economic growth in the region so that net exports have contributed 
negatively to GDP. Croatia managed to shrink its net export gap somewhat during 2003-2005 
to 7.4% of GDP in 2005. In the remaining three countries external trade gaps widened 
considerably in recent years to 17.3%, 10.4% and 6.6 % of GDP in 2005 in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey, respectively, well above the 4.6% average trade deficit registered in 
NMS8. 
In all four countries the primary sectors (agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting) contribute 
much more to total value added than in the EU25. Even though this contribution has generally 
been falling over recent years, in 2005 it was still in the range of 6.7% (CR) to 10.5% (TR) – 
well above 1.9% average for EU25 countries (where it ranged from 0.4 to 5.7% for individual 
countries). Services, on the other hand, have a relatively smaller contribution than in the 
EU25 (mostly due to the lower share of public services such as public administration and 
defence, education and health) but likewise, see their share in value added gradually 
converging to EU levels. 
                                                 
1 12% (BG), 16%(RO), 17%(TR) and 30%(CR), source: Eurostat. 
2 31% (TR), 32%(BG), 34%(RO) and 49%(CR), source: Eurostat. 
3 Unweighted average; 22.7% (RO), 24.8% (TR), 27.2% (CR) and 28% (BG), source, Eurostat. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 3 
 
The region as a whole has managed to translate the economic expansion into higher 
employment. After a rise in unemployment rates in the second half of the 1990, recent years 
brought an improvement in Bulgaria and Croatia while Romania and Turkey have seen their 
rates stabilised (more in line with labour market trends below).  
Figure 1. Annual change of real GDP and its components 
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Source: Eurostat. 
The recent balance of payment developments in the candidate countries is similar to what was 
observed in many NMS in the late 1990s. There, after the widening of current account deficits 
in the second half of 1990s, most non-Baltic NMS countries have seen their deficits narrow in 
recent years. The candidate countries are currently in the high deficit range of 6%-12% of 4 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
GDP
4 with a clear tendency to rise in recent years. This is particularly evident in the fast-
growing countries (BG, RO and TR) where a worsening of the current account deficit can be 
linked to the widening of trade deficits brought about by imports growing to cover the 
expanding domestic demand
5.  The export performance in the region has been relatively good 
with dynamics in the double-digit range (except for the CR in recent years) thanks to 
improved external demand (growth accelerated among all major trade partners) and the 
positive effects of past investments in industry. However, exports have grown slower than 
imports in recent years, which, coupled with relatively stable income and current transfers 
balances, resulted in a worsening of current account deficits. 
Table 1. Main Economic Indicators for Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Turkey, EU15 and NMS 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005
Real  GDP  growth  NMS8*  2.2 5.3 4.5 4.6 5.4 6.0 6.5
in  %  EU15**  3 3.9 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.5
  Bulgaria  2.3 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 5.5
  Croatia  -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.6 5.3 3.8 4.3
  Romania -1.2 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.4 4.1
  Turkey  -4.7 7.4 -7.5 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4
           
GDP per capita in PPS  NMS8*  9.3 10.0 10.7 11.4 11.9  12.8  13.9
thousand PPS  EU15**  20.7 22.1 22.8 23.5 23.7 24.7 25.4
  Bulgaria  4.9 5.3 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.5
  Croatia  7.5 8.2 8.6 9.4 10.0 10.6 11.4
  Romania  4.8 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.5 7.3 8.1
  Turkey  5.5 6.0 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.5 7.2
           
Balance of the Current 
Account 
NMS8*  -6.4 -5.2 -5.0 -5.4 -5.6 -7.3 -6.0
in % of GDP  Bulgaria  -5.1 -5.5 -7.3 -5.6 -8.5 -5.8  -11.8
  Croatia  -7.0 -2.4 -3.7 -8.6 -7.1 -4.9 -6.4
  Romania  -4.0 -3.7 -5.5 -3.3 -5.5 -8.4 -8.7
  Turkey  -0.8 -4.9 2.4 -0.9 -3.3 -5.2 -6.4
           
Inflows  of  FDI  NMS8*  4.9 5.5 4.7 6.2 2.2 3.7 5.1
in % of GDP  Bulgaria  7.1 8.1 5.9 5.9 10.4  13.9  10.8
  Croatia  7.3 5.7 6.8 4.9 6.8 3.5 4.5
  Romania  2.9 2.8 2.9 2.5 3.7 6.7 6.6
  Turkey  0.4 0.5 2.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 2.7
           
Unemployment rates  NMS10*
* 
12.0 13.6 14.5 14.8 14.3 14.2 13.4
in  %  NMS8*  11.5 12.5 12.4 11.8 11.3 11.2 10.1
 Bulgaria  17.0 16.4 19.5 16.8 12.7  11.8  9.9
  Croatia  : 16.1 15.8 14.8 14.3 13.8 12.7
  Romania  6.2 6.8 6.6 7.5 6.8 7.6 7.7
  Turkey  7.7 6.5 8.4 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.3
           
Annual average inflation  NMS8*  4.1 5.3 4.9 3.0 2.0  3.6  3.2
in  %  Bulgaria  2.6 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.1 5.0
Croatia  4.6 3.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.3
Romania 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3  11.9 9.1
(definition: HICP for NMS8, 
BG, RO and TR;  national 
CPI for CR)  Turkey 61.4 53.2 56.8 47.0 25.3  10.1  8.1
Source: Eurostat, UNCTAD (FDI) and national statistical institutes 
* unweighted average 
** weighted average 
                                                 
4 CR -6.3%, TR -6.4%, RO -8.7%, BG -11.8% (2005 data, source Eurostat). 
5 Since 2004 the annual dynamics of imports in BG, RO and TR has exceeded 20%. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 5 
 
Similarly to the NMS, the CC4 region has radically reoriented its foreign trade towards the 
EU25 (Turkey has been trading heavily with the EU since 1960s) and become more open to 
foreign trade in general. In 2005, the share of total exports of goods and services in GDP 
accounted for 60% in BG, 49% in CR, 33% in RO and 29% in TR (63% on average in 
NMS8) which represents a several percentage-point increase in comparison to analogous 
shares in the second half of the 1990s. 
While current account deficits in the CC4 are high and might deteriorate increase further, 
potential problems related to this are partly alleviated by record-high FDI inflows which 
covered more than 3/4 of the deficits in 2003-2005
6 on average (except in Turkey where the 
average coverage in this period was 27%). Furthermore, recent years have seen a marked 
acceleration of FDI inflows across the region: average annual per capita inflows more than 
tripled between 2000-2002 and 2003-2005 in RO (to 189 EUR per capita in the latter period), 
more than doubled in BG (to 273 EUR), increased by 86% in TR (to 54 EUR) while the CR 
recorded a mere 8% rise (to 320 EUR). 
Several years of sound economic growth have brought rising incomes across the region. In 
particular, the period 2002-2005 saw real wages (deflated by the CPI) increase by 2.9% y/y on 
average in TR
7 and BG
8, 3.1% y/y in CR
9, and as much as 8% in RO
10. In addition to steady 
real wage growth, rising domestic consumption in the region has been underpinned by an 
unprecedented expansion of credit. The annual dynamics of domestic credit (in domestic 
currencies) have been accelerating gradually over past several years, reaching very high rates 
in the range of 17% (TR) – 49% (RO) in 2005.  
The region now seems to have achieved stable inflation rates. Turkey and Romania managed 
to bring annual inflation down from high double-digit ranges prevailing before 2004 to rates 
of 7-10% in 2005-2006. Both Romania and Turkey adopted inflation targeting recently (in 
August 2005 and January 2006, respectively) and the former experienced some nominal 
currency appreciation associated with this regime change. However, after the considerable 
disinflation success both countries seem to be stuck just below 10% and cautious monetary 
policies will be needed to bring inflation down further and keep it there in a sustainable 
manner. Inflation in Bulgaria and Croatia has been closer to EU levels over the past few years 
due to a successful stabilisation of the currency – in the strict regime of the currency board 
(BG) or through open market operations aimed at exchange rate stabilisation (CR). Recently, 
inflation has been on the rise in both countries, jumping to several-year highs of 8% in BG 
and 4% in CR in mid-2006. However, these swings were triggered by one-off administrative 
price changes and other supply-side shocks and inflation has been falling again in the third 
quarter. 
 
1.2. Labour Market 
Both activity rates and employment rates in the four countries analysed remain below the 
EU25 average and – with the exception of Romania – also NMS10 levels (Figure 2). Turkey 
                                                 
6 146% in BG, 81% in RO and 80% in CR on average during 2003-2005; source: UNCTAD. 
7 Private manufacturing industry hourly wages, source: Turkstat. 
8 Wages and salaries of the employees under labour contract in total economy (http://www.nsi.bg/Labour_e/ 
Labour_e.htm)  
9 Earnings in total economy (www.hnb.hr) 
10 Gross wages in total economy (www.insse.ro) 6 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
is an outlier in this respect – activity rates (in the 15-64 group) have fallen to just above 51% 
and employment rates to around 46% in recent years. This is explained by the alarmingly low 
participation and employment rate of women in Turkey – roughly one third of the male 
participation and employment rates and well below half of respective rates for women from 
the EU25 and candidate countries. In contrast, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are actually 
characterised by lower gender gaps in economic activity and employment than is the case in 
the EU25. 
Figure 2. Key labour market characteristics of candidate countries: 2000-2005 
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Source: Eurostat. 
Over the last 10-15 years the dynamics of participation and employment were determined by 
economic and demographic developments. Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania went through a 
major restructuring of their economies accompanied by output declines and labour shedding, 
then followed by recovery in recent years. To explain developments in the Turkish labour 
market we should perhaps look at population dynamics (large cohorts entering the productive 
age; migration from rural to urban areas). Nevertheless, recent periods have seen a gradual 
increase in employment along with robust economic growth.  
As far as the sectoral structure of employment is concerned Turkey and Romania stand out 
with a very large share of the labour force in agriculture. Given the very low productivity 
levels of agriculture and the fact that a substantial part of this employment is in fact related to 
subsistence agriculture rather than production for the market, the process of labour shifting 
between sectors is likely to take place in these countries (and – perhaps to a slightly lesser 
extent – also in Bulgaria and Croatia) over the coming years and decades both creating BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 7 
 
problems and opening up opportunities. Another important process with a potentially strong 
influence on the labour market is population ageing and the sharp decline in the size of 
cohorts entering the production age in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, as compared to the 
continued rise of productive-age population in Turkey.  
Over the last 4-5 years Bulgaria and Croatia saw unemployment rates gradually falling from 
very high levels (close to 20% in Bulgaria and around 15% in Croatia) recorded around 2000-
2001. This is very similar to the trends in NMS10 group. In contrast unemployment rates in 
Romania and Turkey were relatively low around 2000 (6.8% and 6.5%, respectively, 
compared to the EU25 average of 8.6% and NMS10 level of 13.6%) but more recent period 
brought their stabilisation at somewhat higher levels. In 2005, standardised unemployment 
rate stood at 7.7% in Romania and 10.3% in Turkey, broadly comparable to EU25 average of 
8.7%.  
Similar trends can be observed in long-term unemployment. Here, the relative success of 
Bulgaria in significantly reducing the long-term unemployment rate could be interesting for 
many of the NMS countries, which has seen little progress in this sphere.  
Looking ahead, labour markets policies in all candidate countries will be faced with very 
similar challenges to those faced by the NMS: (i) past and ongoing economic restructuring; 
(ii) disincentives to labour market participation (iii) a high tax wedge; (iv) administrative and 
legal barriers to job creation including rigidities on the labour market; and (v) skill 
mismatches (World Bank 2005). 
 
1.3. Demography 
Turkey is by far the largest of the candidate countries in terms of population. It is also the 
only one registering population increase, so that by the time of its eventual EU accession 
(2014 or later) it is likely to become the most populated member state (at the moment it is 
somewhat smaller than Germany). Its population increased from 40.3 million in 1975, to 67.8 
million in 2000 and an estimated 71.8 million in 2004. Consequently, currently almost half of 
the population is under the age of 25. This, coupled with expected increase in life expectancy 
(from low levels), implies a continuation of population increase. However, Turkey is now 
following other European countries in that its fertility rate is declining – currently it hovers 
around a replacement rate, still well above the EU average. There is also an important 
regional aspect to this – fertility is higher in less developed eastern regions (where life 
expectancy is significantly lower). Romania is another large country in this respect – its 
population of over 20 million would rank it behind Poland and ahead of the Netherlands. By 
contrast, Bulgaria and Croatia are small countries. Long-term population projections point to 
markedly different developments in the candidate countries. In the period up till 2050 Turkey 
is likely to be among the small group of countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta) 
registering the fastest population increase (by more than 25%). Croatia together with a few 
NMSs (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 3 Baltic States) is likely to see its 
population decline by between 10 and 20% while the pace of depopulation in Bulgaria and 
Romania will be the fastest in Europe – more than 20% (Social Situation Observatory, 
2005).
11 It is therefore clear that in terms of demographic developments candidate countries 
                                                 
11 Based on EUROPOP 2004 projections for EU25 and 2004 UN World Population Prospects for the four 
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fall into two very different groups: Turkey on the one side and the three other countries on the 
other. 
Over the last decade or so demographic trends in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania were broadly 
similar to what was typical for the NMS, or those countries among the NMS with the most 
negative developments in this sphere. Fertility declined to very low levels – well below 1.5, 
an average level in the EU25 as of 2003. Population has been shrinking – and quite 
substantially so in Bulgaria and Romania. In the case of Bulgaria this was largely due to a 
substantial natural decrease, while in the case of Romania a negative migration balance also 
played a significant role. Large migration flows resulting from the Balkan wars in early the 
1990s have had a huge impact on the population of Croatia – some 300 thousand Serbs (ca. 
7% of the whole population) might have left the country in the early 1990s and only some of 
them returned in subsequent years.  
 
1.4. Poverty, income inequalities and the social protection system 
The emergence of the private sector, rewards to entrepreneurship and risk-taking has resulted 
in increasing income inequalities in transition economies, such as Bulgaria, Romania and to a 
lesser extent Croatia. A further consequence of the shift to a market economy has been the 
rising wage premium linked to education in the labour market, which has also contributed to 
growing inequalities. In addition, the corresponding economic restructuring and the 
transformational recession amplified the dynamics of inequalities and changed the spatial 
pattern of inequality. As a result, the Gini coefficient of inequality for household disposable 
income rose to 29-31% in all three transition countries discussed here. In Romania and 
Croatia inequalities have remained at these levels, whilst in Bulgaria inequalities decreased 
from 29% in 1995 to 25% in 2005. Inequalities in Romania and Croatia are similar to the 
corresponding levels in Germany and France and, among the NMSs, Hungary for example. 
Inequality in Bulgaria is below the EU25 average, close to Scandinavian levels and that of 
moderately unequal NMSs, such as the Czech Republic.  
Table 2. Inequalities (Gini indices) 
   BG  HR  RO  TR  NMS10  EU25 
consumption  based  30 25 29 34 na na 
income  based    25 29 30 45 30 30 
Source: World Bank, Eurostat, national statistics. 
Consumption based: BG: 2001, RO, TR: 2002, HR: 2004; income based: BG: 2005, HR, NMS10, EU25: 2004, 
RO, TR: 2003. 
 
Income distribution in Turkey reflects a dualistic social structure with an export-oriented 
competitive sector, predominantly concentrated in Western regions of the country and a less 
efficient, more informal sector with less value added, in particular in the Eastern and South-
Eastern regions. As a consequence of this deep regional divide Turkey is the most unequal 
among the countries considered. Its Gini coefficient of the distribution of household 
disposable income was 45% in 2003, much higher than in any EU member countries. It is 
worth noting that inequalities in consumption, although still large, are much smaller, 34% (see 
Table 2) than income inequalities. This reflects the importance of the household economy, 
and subsistence farming in particular, in the Turkish economy. The two Ginis are somewhat 
different in Croatia as well, whereas the Bulgarian and Romanian figures refer to different 
years so consumption inequalities cannot be compared to income inequalities. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 9 
 
As a consequence of the skewed income distribution, relative poverty is highest in Turkey. 
According to the methodology adopted by the EU, 26% (2003) of the population are 
considered poor (that is, have an equivalent household income below 60% of the median 
income). Croatia and Romania are again similar with a poverty rate of 17% and 18% 
respectively, while Bulgaria has a somewhat lower rate (14%). Poverty is related to labour 
market status, household composition and demography, degree of urbanisation, and region as 
well as ethnicity. In all candidate countries the poverty rate is below average among the 
employed, except in Turkey where the poverty rate among the employed is close to the 
average due to the high prevalence of the informal sector.  
Table 3. Poverty profiles by gender and age  
 Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania  Turkey 
total  14 17 18 25 
      
female  15 18 18 25 
male  13 15 18 25 
        
0-15  18  15  25 32 
16-24  16 13 21 26 
25-49 13  12  16 21 
50-64  10  15  13 18 
65<  18 30 17 20 
Source: Balkandide country reports and Annexes. 
BG: 2005, HR, RO: 2004, TR: 2002. 
Italics/bold-face: lowest/highest prevalence across age-groups of a respective country. 
 
An important dimension of poverty is demography (see Table 3). The poverty rate of children 
in Turkey is higher than average (32%) while that of the elderly is lower than average (20%). 
Children have a higher than average poverty rate in Romania and Bulgaria as well, but in 
Bulgaria the poverty rate among the elderly is also higher than average. In contrast, Croatia 
reveals a different pattern. The elderly are more severely hit by poverty than any other 
demographic group, whereas the poverty rate of children is slightly lower than average. This 
is partly the effect of the social protection system. Families with three or more dependent 
children are also subject to higher than average risk of poverty in all four countries. Poverty 
has an explicit gender face in Bulgaria and Croatia, the two countries where old-age poverty 
is above the average. This is due to the over-representation of women, usually having below 
average pensions, in the oldest cohorts. 
The other critical dimensions of poverty, regional disparities, the rural/urban divide and ethnic 
background will be discussed more in detail below among the special issues.  
The social protection system mitigates poverty and income inequalities with varying degrees 
of effectiveness and efficiency across countries. In the three post-transition candidate 
countries the effectiveness of these institutions, that is, the proportion of people salvaged from 
poverty, is about the same as in the EU25. Social transfers eliminate around 60% of pre-
transfer poverty (see Figure 3). In contrast, there is a 30% pre-transfer poverty rate in Turkey, 
indeed the lowest among the candidate countries, which has decreased to only 26%, leaving 
Turkey with the highest poverty rate in the EU29. 
The candidate countries differ in the effectiveness of their particular social protection 
institutions. In Bulgaria, the social assistance system is not very effective in poverty 
alleviation (European Commission 2006). Income policy is working through the pension 10 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
system, which is an indirect and expensive way of poverty relief. If pensions and other social 
transfers are deducted from household disposable income, the relative poverty rate is 37%, 
which decreases to 16% if pensions are added but the further inclusion of other social 
transfers only brings about another 2 percentage point reduction in the poverty rate. To some 
extent, the same applies to Romania. By contrast, in Croatia transfers other than pensions are 
more effective in reducing poverty. The poverty rate is 39% without pensions and transfers, 
31% after the inclusion of pensions and 18% after the inclusion of other social transfers as 
well. Indeed, the Croatian social assistance system is more effective in poverty mitigation 
than the EU25 average. 
 
Figure 3. Relative poverty rate before and after transfers in 2003 (%) 
 
Note: poverty line is 60% of median equivalent (OECD 2 scale) household disposable income. Source: Eurostat, 
Structural Indicators database. The Eurostat applies two definitions for before-transfer income, one excluding 
pensions (pension transfer) and another one including them (pension income). 
 
Social expenditures are higher in Croatia than in the other three candidate countries (see 
Figure 4). The Croatian social budget, including health, education and other social protection 
expenses such as old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, family benefits and social 
assistance, amounted to 31% of the GDP in 2001 (although it has declined since then), which 
is the same as the average of the current member states. In Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey 
social expenditures as a percentage of the GDP are about ten points lower. The largest 
difference compared to the EU25 average is in expenditure on non-health social protection 
(COFOG 10). While this figure is still close to 20% in Croatia, although decreasing as in the 
EU25 countries, in the other three candidate countries it remains at around 10% of GDP.  
The leading cash programme of social protection is pensions. Pension systems have 
undergone reforms in each candidate country in recent years and they are likely to be further 
reformed in the coming years, although for different reasons. In the three post-transition 
37
39
41
30
44
40
16
31
22
31
27
25
14
18 17
26
15 15
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
BG HR RO TR NMS10 EU25
before transfers, pension transfer before transfer, pension income after transferBALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 11 
 
candidate countries the national pay-as-you-go schemes faced severe financial problems due 
to decreasing participation, the growing informality of the economy, emigration of labour (in 
Bulgaria and Romania) and the decreasing efficiency of contributions collection. In addition, 
the population is shrinking in these three countries and rapid ageing in the next decades 
foretells future problems as well. The case of Turkey is different since the working-age 
population has been growing and is expected to grow further over the coming decades. The 
pension system is still, nevertheless, in deficit due to over-generous options for early 
retirement. 
 
Figure 4. Social protection and social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (%) 
 
Note: COFOG 7: health, COFOG 9: education, COFOG 10: social protection, 
Sources: JIMs, Eurostat, OECD, ILO (2005), Balkandide - Turkey country study. 
Social protection BG, EU25: 2003, HR, RO: 2004, TR: 2005. 
Social expenditures: HR: 2001, BG, EU25: 2003, RO: 2004, TR: 2005. 
 
In all four candidate countries important institutional changes have taken place on this matter. 
The social insurance budget was separated from the government budget in the post-transition 
countries. The fragmented pension system, consisting of separate funds, was unified in 
Croatia and Romania. We will return to this issue below in the informal economy section. A 
similar reform is in the making in Turkey. Collection of social security contributions was 
centralised in Croatia in order to make collection more effective and contributions easier to 
control. 
Further measures in pension reform in post-transition countries followed the 
recommendations of the World Bank. The World Bank not only suggested parametric reforms 
(such as to increase the retirement age, reduce pensions and extend the contribution base) but 
also to build up a pre-funded mandatory pillar in order to mitigate the effects of decreasing 
fertility and increasing longevity. In Bulgaria and Croatia, the pension system has been 
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recently reformed into a three-pillar system with a mandatory pay-as-you-go first pillar, a 
mandatory and funded second pillar and a voluntary funded third pillar. In Romania, a similar 
reform was attempted but it was not, in the end, implemented. Parametric reforms were also 
carried out in these countries. Standard retirement age was increased and the required 
contributory period was also extended. Some of the legislated retirement ages are as high or 
even higher than those within EU15 countries and are usually above those within the NMSs. 
However, actual retirement ages fall below even the current age of entitlement, by 3.2 years 
for men and 0.4 years for women in Bulgaria, 1.5 years for men in Croatia (ILO 2005, 28).  
The coverage of old-age pension, that is the ratio of benefit recipients to those older than 65 is 
76%, in Croatia, while it is around 140% in Bulgaria and Romania due to lower retirement 
ages and early retirement (ILO 2005, 30). Replacement rate, or the ratio of average old-age 
pension to the average gross wage is higher in Bulgaria (38%) and Croatia (34%) than in 
Romania, where the average old age pension is only one quarter of the average gross wage. 
Provision of child-related benefits reflects the demographic situation of the country. The three 
post-transition candidate countries, having relatively older populations, spend relatively more 
on children than Turkey where the age-structure of the population is considerably younger. In 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania child-related benefits reach out to 75-85% of children (ILO 
2005, 38) although recent changes in Croatia and Bulgaria are aimed at reducing coverage of 
certain provisions. In Croatia, child allowance is no longer attached to the employment history 
of the mother but became subjected to a means test after the 1999 reform. In Bulgaria, new 
legislation was adopted in 2002, which reduced benefits and introduced means testing for all 
kinds of benefits (except lump-sum birth grants). Coverage of benefits decreased by 25% after 
the introduction of the means test. 
 
1.5. Quality of governance 
The institutional environment of the economy is a crucial input to economic and social 
development. Difficulties in the enforceability of property rights and contracts and an 
inefficient judiciary system drive up the transaction costs of the economy, which might be a 
severe obstacle to economic growth. The regulatory activity of governments is another 
important component of this institutional environment. If business-creation is overregulated 
entrepreneurs will choose to operate in the informal economy. As informal assets cannot be 
used as collateral to obtain loans, the likely result is slower growth. This affects poor people 
the most since they lack the formal assets necessary to obtain credits (World Bank 2005).  
The World Bank’s project on monitoring governance measures different aspects of the 
institutional environment including the rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and the control of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2005). The rule of law dimension 
measures contract enforceability and the effectiveness of the judiciary. Government 
effectiveness is assessed according to the quality of bureaucracy and the competence of civil 
servants. Regulatory quality measures the occurrence of market-unfriendly policies and 
excessive market regulation. Control of corruption is based on the perception of corruption. 
Governance indicators aggregate information from various related indicators measured in 
diverse data sources. Values of these aggregate indicators are rescaled and normalised (across 
the 209 countries represented in the study) in order to get a standard normal distribution with 
values between –2.5 and +2.5. Higher values indicate better governance.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 13 
 
The four candidate countries do considerably worse than the unweighted average of either the 
eight new Central European member states or the EU15 countries in all dimensions 
considered (see Figure 5). Romania has the lowest scores in three of the four indicators (rule 
of law, government effectiveness and control of corruption); regulatory quality is rated 
slightly better than in Turkey. Indeed, Romania performs below the World average in all four 
dimensions. Turkey is usually around the World average except in the control of corruption. 
Bulgaria and Croatia are closer to the NMS8 average (Croatia in government effectiveness, 
Bulgaria in regulatory quality).  
Governance problems also arise in the administration of social insurance. Collecting 
contributions is ineffective as evasion is widespread. The contribution debt of the Romanian 
pension system was over 6% of GDP in 2002 (down from over 8% in 2000; ILO 2004, 50). 
The covered wage bill (a hypothetical wage bill calculated from contribution revenues and 
contribution rules), which is usually around 40% of GDP in developed economies (see 
Palacios and Pallares-Miralles 2000), was 41% in Croatia and 16% in Romania in 2002 (ILO 
2004, 47).
12 These figures compare to the corresponding numbers of NMSs such as Slovenia 
(35%), Poland and Hungary (both 28%). A low covered wage bill reflects a low wage bill in 
general and a high degree of informality and tax evasion in the economy. Employers employ 
workers with no labour contract or underreport their wages. The situation seems to be 
stabilising, though. Bulgaria witnessed improvements in recent years. The percentage of 
insured persons actually contributing to the pension system increased from 86% to 92%, 
while contributions in arrears decreased from 14% to 9%.  
 
                                                 
12 Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000) calculate the rate of the covered wage bill to GDP across a wide range of 
countries for the mid-1990s. They found 16.3% for Bulgaria (1994), 36.% for Croatia (1997), 20.9% for 
Romania (1994) and 7.2% for Turkey (1990).  
 
Figure 5. The World Bank Governance indicators in selected countries, 2004 
Source: World Bank Governance database; NMS8, EU25, EU15 are unweighted averages. 
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2. Issues of special interest 
2.1 From human capital training to employment 
An effective system of education and training is important for both social and economic 
reasons in all countries, and particularly so in those undergoing structural transformation in 
the process of catching-up with more developed parts of Europe. Among a wide range of 
objectives for education policy, preparation of people for active involvement in social and 
economic life, in particular through employment is of special relevance. In comparison with 
the EU, the four countries covered in this report are characterised by somewhat weaker human 
capital levels and inferior performance of the educational systems and lower employment 
rates and other problems of the labour market functioning. There is a strong link between 
these two spheres and education is arguably an important part of the solution to the difficult 
labour market issues, such as the low employment rates of certain groups in society, hidden 
unemployment in agriculture, high long-term unemployment, high youth unemployment, etc. 
This section highlights some of the key issues for the education-labour market nexus. 
In order to explain the importance of the link between the quality and availability of education 
and labour market outcomes one may look at the wide literature concerning skill-biased 
technical change (SBTC). SBTC is often defined as an increase in the relative productivity of 
skilled workers against unskilled workers resulting from fast transition from skills-replacing 
technologies to skill-intensive technologies, as discussed by Katz and Autor (1999) for 
example. To claim that the process of fast technological and economic convergence of 
candidate countries to EU averages makes the SBTC process especially fast in the former 
group is not in question. This leads to a rapid change of the employment structure with more 
demand for labour characterised by higher average skill content/requirements.  
Recent employment trends in agriculture and industry in the candidate countries (Figure 6, 
Panels A and B) and the scale of differences in employment structure by occupations between 
the candidate countries and the EU15 (Figure 6, C) can be informative in this context. The 
former two capture the pace and direction of change of structural characteristics of candidate 
countries’ economies and the remaining distance for full convergence. The latter illustrates 
how the differences in employment structure by sector transform into diversities in 
occupational structure, being a proxy for skill content/requirements.  
The general trend of declining employment in agriculture (and rising employment in services 
– not shown on the graph) is an indication of the convergence process taking place. However, 
increasing shares of industry indicate that the process will not be straightforward and that 
candidate countries (perhaps with the exception of Croatia) follow the earlier path of the West 
European economies where the transfer of employment from agriculture to services has taken 
place via industry.   
The problem is, however, that the current global economic environment is very different from 
that of 20-50 years ago when a similar transformation was taking place in Western Europe. 
With much increased global economic integration, the industrialisation of European 
economies is now made more difficult due to rising competition from developing countries 
such as China and India. This implies that the scope for a slow, gradual transfer of labour 
from elementary jobs in agriculture to elementary jobs in industry at the first stage and then to 
more sophisticated jobs in industry and services at the second stage is strongly limited. Most 
probably the skill intensity of average jobs in candidate countries will have to increase much 
faster than was the case in Western Europe.  16 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
Even in countries with economic structures slightly closer to the EU15 average (Bulgaria and 
Croatia), the occupational structure is visibly different from the EU15. In all candidate 
countries the share of occupations requiring higher skills (senior officials, professionals, 
technicians and clerks) is lower than in the EU15. On the other hand the proportion of less 
skill-intensive jobs is higher (agricultural workers, crafts, machine operators and the category 
called ‘elementary occupations’). As the economic structures of these countries converge with 
the EU the skill-content of the average job will increase. The speed of economic convergence 
and the pace of skill-convergence are closely interrelated.  
 
Figure 6. Employment structures in the EU15 and candidate countries 
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Panel C. Employment by occupation as a share of total employment in 2006 (2005 for Croatia), (%) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat LFS data.  
 
One has also take into account that this rapid transformation of the labour markets and labour 
forces of candidate countries takes place (and will be taking place) in an environment where 
the average education level of the labour force, and perhaps more importantly, the quality of 
education attained and the extent to which skills are up-to-date, is somewhat lower than in 
advanced EU economies (there are large differences between candidate countries in this 
respect, too). One consequence of this may be that the convergence process involves high 
social costs, such as high unemployment rates among unskilled groups and increasing skill-
related wage dispersion. Another result may be that the catch-up process itself is hindered, 
e.g. when public pressure persuades governments to try protecting unproductive jobs (a 
history of coal mining restructuring in Romania is a case in point). 
There are no easy solutions to this problem, at least in the short term. In the long run it can 
possibly be solved by significant advances in education. The education system should provide 
young people with skills matching the needs of modern, internationally competitive 
economies. Older workers should be offered a wide range of possibilities to update and 
improve their skills. This last task requires a well functioning system (formal and informal) of 
continuous education and a culture of life-long learning. Below we look at certain 
characteristics of the education systems and processes that are particularly relevant from this 
perspective. 
The education systems in all four candidate countries have undergone substantial changes 
over the last decade or so, but the starting points were different. All countries have now 
achieved universal coverage of education at primary level, but in Turkey this achievement is 
relatively recent. Depending on the measure applied the educational attainment of the working 
age population is below or on a par with the EU average (with the exception of Turkey, where 
it is much lower). On the one hand people who completed at least upper secondary education 
in candidate countries (with the exception of Turkey) actually represent a higher share of the 
total population aged 25-64 than the EU average (NMS10 average is yet higher), but the share 
of tertiary graduates in the labour force is low in Turkey, Croatia, and Romania (in Bulgaria it 18 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
is at the EU average). However, current trends indicate on average a shorter (relative to the 
EU and the NMS) schooling period in all candidate countries, with the exception of Croatia. 
In Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey participation rates drop considerably around the age of 18-
19 (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Educational attainment indicators at secondary and tertiary level 
Panel A. % of the population aged 18-24 with (at most) lower secondary education and not in further education 
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Note: The jump in the share of students in Croatia between 2003 and 2004 suggests a lack of data 
comparability. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
In Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria (even at primary level) several population groups reflect 
low levels of participation in education far below national averages. This applies to the Roma 
minority in Romania and Bulgaria and girls from poor families, particularly in South-Eastern 
Turkey (Roma Education Fund, 2004a; 2004b; World Bank, 2006b). Besides, education 
systems of the candidate countries are not always successful in providing adequate services to 
groups such as disabled people (in all countries) or the small Roma minority in Croatia 
(similar problems can be observed in many EU countries). While improvement in educational 
provision for these groups is certainly difficult to achieve, a substantial part of the problem is 
also in the demand for education expressed by disadvantaged groups; it is clear that 
substantial and rapid progress is a necessary precondition for improving the social status of 
these groups, limiting the incidence of poverty and avoiding the trap of inherited social 
exclusion. One of the key mechanisms supporting social integration is employment.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 19 
 
The link from education to employment and full social participation can be illustrated by the 
case of women in Turkey. While the employment rate of women in general is alarmingly low 
compared to male employment rates in Turkey (just above one third of the male employment 
rate) and relative to female employment rate typical for EU countries (below half), labour 
market performance of women with tertiary education is comparable to those of men (World 
Bank, 2006a). The issue of skills is becoming more important as women (together with their 
families) migrate to cities, where the options of employment in agriculture are no longer 
viable, but other employment options require much higher skills that women from rural 
backgrounds rarely possess. Since rural-urban migration is bound to continue, the problem 
will not disappear. Remedies are not easy to apply, but improving the access and quality of 
education in rural areas and opening opportunities for adult training in cities emerge as key 
components of the policy response.  
Another crucially important issue is the quality of education and specifically the skills that the 
people are equipped with upon completion of various stages of their education. Evidence for 
the quality of the system can be found in the relative success of graduates of various 
educational institutions in the labour market. Here the experience of the candidate countries is 
mixed, but the prevalence of high unemployment rates among young people just entering the 
labour market is not that easy to interpret. In Turkey, for instance (and in other countries) it 
can indicate a combination of inadequate skills in graduates and an insufficient creation of  
high-skill jobs in the economy. Other important evidence for the quality of education can be 
found in international assessment programmes, particularly those looking at the ability of the 
students to put their knowledge to use in typical non-academic circumstances. 
Assessing the quality of education is far from trivial, if only because the socio-economic 
background of pupils remains key in determining educational outcomes in almost all 
countries. Still, international comparisons of educational outcomes remain perhaps the most 
reliable proof of quality assessment. Here, the results of candidate countries appear to be 
below EU averages (in some cases substantially below), but the comparison is complicated by 
insufficient data and the picture is mixed. In particular Croatia did not participate in any 
international comparison programmes, so there is no evidence on the situation there.
13 Among 
the three other countries Turkey and Romania clearly lag behind the EU as indicated by very 
low average PISA scores and a very high proportion of 15 year-olds achieving the lowest 
proficiency levels. TIMSS results (on mathematic and science proficiency) for the period 
1995-2003, apart from confirming the poor performance of Turkey, also show that the results 
of Romania’s eighth graders were flat during this period (and below European averages), 
despite ongoing educational reforms. A worrisome development can be observed in the case 
of Bulgaria, where eighth-grade students fared very well ten years ago, but since then there 
has been a serious deterioration in test scores, and Bulgaria has gradually fallen to very low 
levels. A somewhat different picture – particularly with respect to Bulgaria – emerges from 
the analysis of comparative reading achievements of fourth-graders (aged 9-10) as measured 
by PIRLS 2001 (IEA, 2003). Here, Bulgaria was in the group of countries with the best 
results, Romania was at or just above international average, while Turkey was among the 
worst performers (recording – together with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – the 
weakest scores among European countries participating in the study). 
There is scant information on the relative magnitude of problems regarding the quality of 
education in different types of institutions. Vocational education is one field where it is 
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particularly difficult to upgrade curricula to meet changing demand for skills in the labour 
market and also to keep the programmes attractive to young people. There is a general trend 
of expansion of general secondary education at the expense of the vocational stream. This 
primarily reflects the increasing demand for more education among the youth, but may lead to 
a trap where some people complete their education at general secondary level without any 
practical skills that could make them attractive in the labour market. Indeed, in Bulgaria and 
Turkey unemployment rates among young people with secondary vocational education 
appears to be visibly lower than among those with general secondary education. In Romania, 
both groups face similar unemployment rates (Betcherman, 2006). The difficult challenge is 
therefore in avoiding a collapse of the vocational stream by upgrading curricula, making them 
both attractive to students and relevant from the labour market perspective.  
The rapid increase in tertiary participation rates calls for increased attention in ensuring that 
the expansion in quantity of provision will not lead to a major deterioration in quality. The 
importance of this issue appears to have been noticed by policy makers in the countries 
covered in this report. For example in Romania, following a review on the quality of tertiary 
education a new institution (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education) 
was to become operational by end-2006. The efficient functioning of such institutions may be 
important in ensuring that higher education institutions observe some minimum standards, 
and that prospective students have access to objective information on the quality of services 
offered by different providers and also on the labour market outcomes of graduates to allow 
informed choices in the fields of study. 
 
Figure 8: Life-long learning and participation in education activities in candidate countries 
%  of population in education 
 and training 2002-2005 
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Monitoring educational outcomes (by international comparison, but also within countries) 
certainly deserves attention and it is worth devoting resources to this. This would offer a very 
useful tool for designing educational policies. It could also help in addressing key questions 
such as whether education plays a role in social cohesion by providing equal chances for 
                                                 
14 We are grateful to Terry Ward for providing us with data broken down by age. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 21 
 
equally talented people, and whether the educational system provides people with skills 
needed in the labour market of today and teaches them how to adapt to the constant changes 
in the labour market necessary in the globaled and integrated world of fast technical progress. 
The answers can be different for younger generations (covered by the state educational 
system) and for the older people (who can or perhaps cannot have access to life-long learning 
facilities). 
Candidate countries’ achievements in the sphere of continuous education can be assessed as 
unsatisfactory (see Figure 8). The levels of adult participation in life-long learning are much 
lower than EU and NMS averages (see left panel of Figure 8). Over the 2002-2005 period 
only Turkey and Romania saw (very limited) improvement in this indicator – in line with 
prevailing EU trends, while in Bulgaria and Croatia participation rates have stagnated. 
It is mainly the older strata of the population who suffer from the skills mismatch resulting 
from rapid technological change and economic restructuring. Therefore one would expect that 
older persons in the candidate countries would be relatively more interested in education and 
training then their counterparts in the European Union. However, this does not seem to be the 
case (or there is simply no offer suitable for older workers). Participation rates in Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania, apart from being much lower in general, also appear to be much more 
concentrated among the youngest cohorts than in EU countries (see right panel of Figure 8). 
In the EU25, people aged 25-44 are twice as likely to participate in education and training 
activities than people aged 45-64. In practice this means that people over 35 years of age (in 
Croatia perhaps 45 years) did not participate in any training at all as of early 2005. In view of 
this it is important to build a relevant training offer and promote it among people in the 
middle of their working career and not only among the elderly. 
The candidate countries are at various stages of reform in their educational system. While the 
past actions have already brought important positive results (such as an increase in the supply 
of primary education classrooms by 30% in the six years following the 1997 act on primary 
education in Turkey), the progress has been uneven and – not unexpectedly – certain 
problems impaired reform implementation and their outcomes. This partly relates to the 
quality of governance in general – education is one of the spheres where changes are often 
difficult to implement and require a high professional level of administration and planning, 
putting into practice and overseeing the execution of the changes. 
Available statistics suggest that candidate countries devote a somewhat lower share of their 
resources to investment in education than is typical for EU countries. In 2002, public 
spending on education as a share of GDP oscillated around 3.5-3.6% of GDP in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey and 4.6% in Croatia, compared to EU25 average of 5.2% (and 5.3% in 
the NMS). By this measure private spending in Bulgaria and Turkey appear to be roughly on 
a par with EU averages (although possibly private spending is of a different nature – e.g. in 
some regions of Turkey it is not uncommon that parents contribute to the heating of school 
buildings), while private spending plays a lesser role in Croatia and Romania. Naturally, this 
implies lower expenditure per student in candidate countries, even if measured at PPP 
exchange rates. However, when spending per pupil is related to GDP per capita the difference 
between candidate countries and the EU largely disappears (data are available only for 
Bulgaria and Romania). Another interesting feature is that both Bulgaria and Romania spend 
more on their tertiary students relative to students at earlier stages of education than is typical 
in EU countries (Commission, 2005).  
The resulting picture (further complicated by demographic trends and changing educational 
participation patterns) is therefore complex and available information does not allow for the 22 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
formulation of clear judgments as to whether the current level of investment in education is 
sufficient in the candidate countries. We are inclined to believe that in view of the importance 
of education for socio-economic development some increase in public resources devoted to 
education could be justified in the medium- to long-term, although this should be preceded by 
reforms improving the efficiency of the education system, and the introduction of mechanisms 
allowing for the monitoring of educational outcomes. How the money is spent is perhaps 
much more important than the level of public resources devoted to education. 
 
2.2. Regional disparities and the social protection system 
Neoclassical growth theory predicts convergence, in the long run, of countries and regions on 
the grounds of the public goods nature of technology. The main driving force behind this 
reduction in productivity gaps is capital accumulation. By contrast, the theory of endogenous 
growth emphasises the private or local nature of technology, which is entrenched in 
cooperative networks of economic actors such as firms or other types of economic 
organisations. Accordingly, diffusion of technology also depends on factors other than capital 
accumulation. Regional or national disparities are not bound to decrease, but they can be 
maintained or even increase if less developed regions are unable to absorb higher productivity 
technologies. In addition, substantial regional disparities hold the potential to induce 
processes, including internal and external migration (with the associated brain-drain), which 
may further widen regional differences and lead to divergent development paths between 
regions in the same country. Successful policies to integrate less developed regions, while not 
easy to design and implement, may prevent such processes running their course or may even 
reverse them.  The Third Progress Report on Cohesion by the European Commission (2005) 
found that output disparities decreased across member states, but increased across regions. 
Effects of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds are not self-evident on the regional level. 
 
Table 4. Selected measures of regional disparities in candidate countries, various years 
country measure  year  NUTS 
level 
number of 
territorial units 
coefficient of 
variation 
Gini
* 
Bulgaria GDP/capita  2003  2  6  0.26  0.12 
Bulgaria, excl. Sofia  GDP/capita  2003  2  5  0.03  0.02 
Bulgaria GDP/capita  2003  3  28  0.28  0.14 
Bulgaria, excl. Sofia  GDP/capita  2003  3  27  0.16  0.11 
Croatia GDP/capita  2003  3  21  0.32  0.16 
Romania GDP/capita  2003  2  8  0.37  0.19 
Romania, excl. Bucharest GDP/capita  2003  2  7  0.16  0.10 
Romania GDP/employee  2002  2  8  0.44  0.22 
Turkey GDP/capita  2001  1  12  0.39  0.23 
Turkey GDP/capita  2001  2  26  0.42  0.24 
EU25 GDP/  capita  2003  2  254  0.46  0.25 
* The Gini index reflects dispersion of per capita GDP by territorial units and not household incomes. 
Source: European Commission (2005b), World Bank (2002, 2005), Eurostat, national statistics. 
 
The four candidate countries differ in their regional patterns of development and strategies, 
which in some cases are, and in other cases are not implemented to deal with regional 
differences. Table 4 shows selected measures of variation across countries and at various 
levels of territorial units. These measurements include, where available, the coefficient of BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 23 
 
variation and the Gini index calculated across territorial units. The coefficient of variation 
comprises more information, but it is sensitive to outliers. The Gini-index, by contrast, is 
more sensitive to dispersion in the middle of a distribution, but its application for aggregates, 
such as regions, is less usual. Since the variation of per capita GDP among aggregates, such 
as territorial units, is smaller than that of per capita income among individuals for obvious 
reasons, the values of the Gini index are lower here than the usual values known from 
inequalities studies. To put this another way, even relatively small Gini values here reflect 
considerable inter-regional differences. Figure 9 shows the Gini values of per capita GDP 
across NUTS2 regions for all EU25 countries having 4 or more level 2 territorial units. 
 
Figure 9. Gini of per capita GDP in euro across NUTS2 regions (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2005), World Bank (2005), Eurostat. 
Note: Turkey: 2001; Croatia: NUTS3. 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria is strongly capital-centred but other parts of the country, at least the 6 territorial units 
at level 2, are rather homogenous in terms of per capita GDP. In particular, the only 
outstanding level 2 territorial unit, the South-West region, including Sofia and its 
surroundings, is alone responsible for almost the entire variation across the regions (Table 4 
rows 1 and 2).  Disparities across the 28 level 3 units are somewhat larger even after the 
exclusion of the capital from the calculation (Table 4 rows 3 and 4). Within-region disparities, 
in particular between urban and rural areas are wider than between-region differences. 
According to the Survey on rural development needs of the World Bank (2004) the per capita 
GDP in rural areas is only about half of the corresponding figure in towns. Household 
strategies to cope with poverty differ between rural and urban areas. Subsistence farming as a 
second job significantly reduces the risk of poverty compared to those who have no second 
job, whereas in urban areas the poverty risk is the same irrespective of holding one or two 
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jobs (World Bank 2002, 34)). Subsistence agriculture thus represents an important part of the 
safety net. 
Internal migration frequently amplifies regional disparities, as it is usually the young, the 
better educated and the more able that leave less developed areas. However, a high proportion 
of owner-occupied dwellings (92%) hinder internal mobility in Bulgaria. This, combined with 
the dependence of house prices on regional economic performance, inhibits labour force 
migration from depressed regions to more prosperous ones. 
The social assistance system was decentralised at the beginning of the transition. However, 
underfinanced local authorities with administrations unprepared for the job were frequently 
unable to provide even basic services so the system was recentralised between 1998 and 2001. 
As a consequence, per capita social assistance expenditures have little relation to per capita 
GDP across the 28 NUTS3 level regions. If Sofia is included in the calculation the two 
distributions are weakly and negatively correlated. Regions with lower GDP tend to receive 
somewhat higher social assistance (r = -0.29). This is solely due to the low per capita social 
assistance in Sofia. If the capital is excluded from the calculation even the weak correlation 
disappears (r = 0.05) despite the variation of per capita GDP across level 3 territorial units. 
By international comparison (see Figure 3 on social protection before and after transfers) 
poverty alleviation relies heavily on the pension system in Bulgaria whilst the social 
assistance system, which applies means-tests and targets poverty directly, is rather ineffective 
in elevating the poor above the poverty line. The two main means-tested social assistance 
programmes are monthly benefit and the Energy benefit. Monthly benefits are granted to 
people who live under the Guaranteed Minimum Income level. Energy Benefits are paid to 
households that have difficulties paying for heating during the winter and are also subject to 
means testing. These social assistance programmes are administered by the Regional 
Directorates of the Social Assistance Agency. Neither the pension system, which is, by its 
nature, a national programme, nor the social assistance system gives much discretion to the 
regional directorates or local directorates. 
 
Croatia 
Per capita GDP figures are currently available only at NUTS3 (county) level. Since the 
variation across higher level, larger units is usually lower than across lower level units, the 
Croatian Gini value in Table 4 or Figure 9 is less straightforward to compare with the 
corresponding figures of other countries. Nevertheless, as it seems, Croatia is fairly capital-
centred; the city of Zagreb brings about one-fourth of the coefficient of variation across the 
counties.  
The recent World Bank (2006) study on poverty found that the tax-transfer system effectively 
redistributes income across counties in favour of the poorer areas. The 5 analytical territorial 
units, which the study used for level 2 territorial units had higher deviation in terms of per 
capita GDP than in terms of primary income and still less in terms of disposable income. In 
addition, among level 3 territorial units, the five counties with the lowest per capita GDP are 
not those that have the lowest per capita disposable income or per capita consumption or 
average monthly earnings or the highest headcount poverty rate. There seems to be a clearer 
divide between urban and rural areas. The same survey found 6.2% of the urban population 
against 18.3% of the rural population below the poverty line. The county level averages 
frequently hide large intra-county disparities, such as in the case of the Dalmatian counties 
that include the prosperous coast line as well as the less affluent Dalmatian Hinterland.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 25 
 
Another important aspect of regional disparities in Croatia is the effect of the recent war. 
About one-quarter of the country was occupied and about half was directly affected by the 
hostilities. The war left a legacy of destroyed infrastructure, land mines and led to the 
depopulation of certain areas. The effects are persistent and even self-accelerating as the most 
active 18-40 year old cohorts are underrepresented among the returnees. In order to mitigate 
the consequences and avert the negative trends the government defined preferential territories, 
or areas of special state concern. The preferential treatment includes tax exemptions for local 
citizens and governments as well as for investors and direct investments in accommodation 
and infrastructure. The programme has not yet been evaluated systematically. According to 
the qualitative assessment in the corresponding Balkandide - Croatia country study part of the 
initially planned measures have not been implemented, and adverse trends have not been 
impeded. Unemployment is still exceptionally high in these regions, investment activity is 
undesirably low, the depopulation trend seems to be continuing and the income structure of 
households apparently shows the signs of welfare dependency. 
Croatian cash transfers are still largely centralised, except for housing and fuel allowances, 
which are county and city-financed. The role of the non-governmental sector in the provision 
of social services is slowly increasing. Coverage of social assistance extends to 4-6% of the 
population. In 2002, the social assistance system was partly decentralised in that financing 
and maintaining some of the in-kind services, such as old people’s homes and care centres, 
was delegated to local governments. In addition, local governments may also top up other 
social assistance programmes or establish their own programmes. Since local governments 
differ widely in their financial capacities decentralisation may possibly provide incentives for 
internal welfare migration. As the Balkandide - Croatia country study stated, there has not yet 
been enough evidence collected about the actual functioning of this multi-level system. 
 
Romania 
Romania is a highly capital-centred country. It has 8 territorial units on level 2, which are 
rather homogenous in terms of per capita GDP with the exception of Bucharest. The latter 
alone is responsible for nearly 60% of the coefficient of variation of regional per capita GDP. 
Only Belgium, France (including overseas regions), Hungary and Slovakia have deeper 
regional disparities among current member states if measured by the Gini-index (see Figure 
9). 
Bucharest attracts about half of all foreign direct investment; it has the lowest poverty rate and 
the highest life expectancy. In contrast, it has the lowest labour market participation rate and 
the lowest employment rate among the regions. In general, the participation rate and the 
employment rate are negatively correlated (r = -0,6, and r = -0.7, respectively) with per capita 
GDP across regions, whereas the rate of unemployment, by the ILO definition, is positively 
correlated (r = 0.5) with it. Regions with the lowest output level, such as South-West Oltenia, 
North-East and South Muntenia have the highest participation rates as well as the highest 
employment rates. This reveals still wider disparities in efficiency, when measured as GDP 
per employed (see Table 4 row 6). 
Data on employment dynamics provide a greater insight into cross-regional differences in the 
speed of economic restructuring. Although the employment rate decreased in all regions 
between 1997 and 2003, the higher the per capita GDP in a region, the smallest this decrease 
was (r = 0.9). This predicts a further decline in employment across the poorer regions and a 26 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
further pressure on the social protection system or, in its absence, pressure to migration to the 
subsistence economy. 
By sectoral distribution, a high proportion, over 30%, of the employed work in agriculture. 
This is more than in any other country among the NMSs. Nearly two-thirds of the land 
consists of subsistence farms, with a high rate of self-consumption and limited linkages to the 
agricultural products market. This is due to the way partial restitution of the pre-war land 
property reallocated very small land holdings to a large number of people, and due also to the 
absence of a proper framework system for land transactions, which would lead to the 
emergence of reasonably sized farms. The lack of proper credit mechanisms, entrepreneurship 
and preparedness of producers as well as the weaknesses of the food market mechanism leave 
this sector stagnating at best. Lack of job opportunities in urban areas and a potential 
mismatch between demand and supply of skills renders it difficult for the excess labour in 
agriculture to find more efficient employment elsewhere. Indeed, from the late 1990s the 
direction of internal migration reversed and more people moved from cities to rural areas than 
vice versa. In the absence of effective social protection and efficient employment services, 
subsistence agriculture absorbed a considerable share of the newly unemployed who lost their 
jobs during the recession of the late 1990s.  
The Romanian social assistance system has a highly fragmented structure with a large number 
of small programmes and overlapping responsibilities of various central agencies. The Social 
Security Inquiry of the ILO (2005) identified 48 different benefits within this framework. The 
distribution of resources and responsibilities among central and local authorities are opaque 
and it is frequently based on informal processes. The local administrations are discouraged 
from raising their own revenues and the allocation criteria of central tax revenues by the 
principle of ‘territorial solidarity’ are frequently unclear and deliberately ignored. This creates 
fertile ground for cronyism and political migration toward parties winning general elections.  
The same procedure frequently favours people in richer counties at the expense of poorer 
counties. The key component of the social assistance programme, the Minimum Guaranteed 
Income (MGI), is set as an income level to which effective incomes of the poor are supposed 
to be topped up. However, average social benefits tend to be significantly higher in richer 
counties as compared to poorer counties. 
The same problems of centralisation and weak enforceability of rules apply to the distribution 
of funds at the county level as well. As the Balkandide – Romania country report stated 
“[a]lthough a strict formula should apply for the distribution of funds at the county level, 
deviations from this standard are tolerated on the large scale and the usual practice is actually 
based on some unclear quantitative criteria. No local council knows the amount that will be 
allocated by the county, since the process relies on individual negotiations between the two 
levels; rural communes will therefore suffer the most from this erratic distribution. ... The 
lowest level of local government, rural communes, receives transfers from the county 
councils. Since their capacity to raise local taxes is very limited, the main source of revenue 
remains funds allocated from above; when this money comes from the state budget, it passes 
through the county council, which keeps for its own needs a corresponding part and then 
transfers to lower echelons whatever remains available. It follows that the only workable 
mechanism allowing a local authority to get more resources is the use of personal influence 
and networking.”  
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Turkey 
Regional disparities in Turkey are wide and differ from those of other candidate countries. 
Turkey is not capital-centred (neither Ankara, the administrative capital, nor Istanbul, the 
financial, economic and cultural centre is the richest region), as in many member states, but it 
has a development gap between its Western and the Eastern regions. If measured by the Gini 
index of per capita GDP its regions differ from each other almost as much as the 254 regions 
of the current 25 member states of the EU combined. This wide variation is not due to some 
outliers; there are not simply one or two exceptional regions. Output differences are echoed in 
various other human development measures as well. Life expectancy at birth is ten years 
longer in Marmara than in Eastern-Anatolia. Respective shares of under-weight children 
among children of 5 years or younger are 6% and 19%. The adult literacy rate is over 89% in 
Marmara but only 62% in South-Eastern Anatolia (World Bank 2005 and Balkandide – 
Turkey country report). The overall Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.869 in Kocaeli, 
the most developed province, which is above the national averages of some Central European 
NMSs, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. In contrast, the lowest HDI value of 
Kars province was only 0.644 in 2000 (Bugra 2005). 
Family structure and fertility and access to education follow the same regional patterns. These 
and other pieces of indirect information support the view of a similar regional disparity in the 
role of the subsistence economy and coverage by social security. Further data collection is 
needed to fully confirm this view. 
As Table 5 displays, efficiency in those segments that are connected with the formal economy 
is considerably higher than in Bulgaria and Romania. The gross value added is comparable 
and in sectors like services or manufacturing it is even higher than the corresponding values in 
the Czech Republic, one of the most advanced NMS. Efficiency in agriculture, however, is 
lagging behind and the existence of an extended subsistence segment confirms the dual nature 
of the economy.  
 
Table 5. Sectoral Gross Value Added per person employed, 2000 (Thousand current €s) 
 Agriculture  Industry  Services Economy  average 
Bulgaria 4.3  3.7  4.3  4.1 
Romania 1.1  5.8  7.5  4.2 
Turkey 4.6  13.5  15.7  10.9 
Czech Republic  9.7  12.4  12.1  11.7 
Source: EUROSTAT. No comparable data of Croatia are available. 
 
Regional disparities are not only present but, as Gezici and Hewings (2004) demonstrate, they 
did not decrease over time in the last decades. The authors found no evidence of convergence 
across provinces or functional regions between 1980 and 1997 despite the Priority Provinces 
Development programme of the government, which aimed at decreasing cross-provincial 
discrepancies. Their analysis indicates that priority provinces did not grow faster than core-
developed provinces. 
The backbone of the social assistance system is the Social Assistance and Solidarity 
Encouragement Fund (SYDTF, by its Turkish acronym), which advises and finances 931 
Social Solidarity Foundations (SYDVs) in the 81 provinces (NUTS3 level regions) and 850 
sub-provinces. The resources of the SYDTF are distributed across the SYDVs reflecting the 
population structure and the local socioeconomic development index of the regions. The 28 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
SYDVs are separate legal entities, independent of the SYDTF. The Board of Trustees of the 
SYDVs have extensive discretion in making the local assistance programme and define who 
is in need and who is not in their respective regions.  
 
2.3 The informal economy and the social protection system 
Based on ILO (2002) we differentiate between two main sectors of the informal economy, the 
enterprise sector and the household sector, although the borderline between the two sectors 
can be at times blurred. They both share some common features, as they are unreported, 
unaccounted for and not taxed, but they differ in many other respects. Below we will focus on 
differences regarding social cohesion and social protection. 
The enterprise sector informal economy consists of market-based production of goods and 
services, similar to transactions of the formal economy, but unlike the latter it remains 
undetected in calculations of the official GDP. 
The enterprise sector informal economy has various forms of unreported income derived from 
the production of legal goods and services to employee discounts and some types of fringe 
benefits to bartering of services and goods and to legally prohibited commerce, such as 
prostitution, drug trafficking or gambling. On the one hand, the enterprise sector informal 
economy distorts the allocation of productive resources and, being unenforceable by regular 
legal mechanisms, limits the division of labour and gives rise to private law enforcement. On 
the other hand, it may also create welfare by circumventing inefficient regulation. The extent 
of the enterprise sector informal economy strongly and negatively correlates with the quality 
of governance of the economy. Informality of property rights, weak performance of the 
judicial system, excessive regulation of the economy and high taxes are all thrusts for the 
informal economy. Figures in Table 6 show that the enterprise sector is considerably more 
informal in the candidate countries (above one-third of GDP is produced in the informal 
sector) as compared to the NMSs (the corresponding figure is slightly above one-quarter) and 
the EU15 countries (17%).  
 
Table 6. Share of the enterprise sector informal economy in the GDP, 2002/03, (%) 
Bulgaria Croatia Romania Turkey  CC4  NMS8  EU15
* 
38.3 35.4 37.4 34.3 35.1 27.0 17.4 
Note: CC4, NMS8 and EU15 are averages weighted by size of economy. EU15: excluding Luxemburg. 
Source: Schneider (2006), Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
Informality affects commodity markets when trade evades sales tax, excise tax or VAT, as 
well as labour markets. Informal employment is also characterised by atypical employment 
settings, such as seasonal or temporary employment, self-employment and other similar 
forms. Coverage of workers by social protection under such arrangements is limited. 
Employees of the informal sector have restricted access to public health care, social security 
pensions and unemployment protection. Such lack of coverage, whilst perhaps controlling 
some negative incentive effects of the social protection system on savings, labour supply and 
fertility, leaves employees of the informal sector unprotected. These people face poverty in 
old age and a severe fall in living standards in case of job loss or illness. Such consequences 
are also likely to be inherited by the next generation.  BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 29 
 
The household sector informal economy takes on various forms depending on the level of 
economic development. In low-income societies the majority of economic activities, most 
notably subsistence farming, are organised within the household or the extended kinship. Here 
the division of labour and specialisation, and consequently efficiency, are limited. Monetary 
income is small as most products are made for own consumption. Skills acquired in such an 
economy are hardly applicable outside the household so alternative employment is sporadic 
and temporary usually offering low compensation. Household labour does not accrue 
eligibility in social security so old age security and insurance against other contingencies can 
only be provided by the extended family or kinship network. Such networks can function well 
as substitutes for social protection but still fall behind it in efficiency due to the limited risk 
pool. The seamy side of family-based social protection is a level of fertility that undermines 
investments in the human capital of children and threatens economies with overpopulation. 
Low efficiency in subsistence agriculture exposes people to poverty even in absolute terms. 
Life expectancy is significantly lower. Yet, there are significant difficulties in how to lift 
people or communities out of this type of poverty. The social capital or network capital of the 
extended family is frequently an asset lost if individuals leave the community. This effect 
limits the potential for the education of marketable skills if people have to move to find a job 
in their new profession. If people move to follow employment opportunities the 
intergenerational chain of support and care within the family may fall apart and the elderly 
left behind will need social assistance. Recent experiments with micro-loans are promising. 
Either they can help households produce surplus and invest or to introduce new, non-
agricultural local production. Nevertheless, the growing efficiency of farming creates excess 
labour and induces internal migration. 
In Table 7 we collected some relevant data concerning the relationship of the informal 
economy and the social protection system. In the first row of the table we show the variation 
of non-regular employment across candidate countries. The term covers the self-employed, 
non-paid family workers and daily paid workers. The last two groups are particularly relevant 
in Turkey. Non-regular employment usually creates problems of underreporting or non-
reporting of economic activities and consequently, coverage problems for social insurance 
programmes. Due to their large subsistence farming sector, Romania and Turkey have a much 
higher share of these workers employed under non-regular conditions than Bulgaria and 
Croatia. This is reflected in the institutional history of their pension systems.  
The candidate countries have a limited tradition of occupational pension schemes. This is 
frequent in countries where legislation initiated much of the pension system rather than the 
other way around, such as in Switzerland, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, where it 
was employers who set up pension schemes first and legislation only regulated the schemes 
already established later. In the former group of countries the typical way is forming a 
pension scheme first for civil servants then a separate scheme for blue-collar workers and 
finally, a third one for the self-employed and/or farmers. In some cases the self-employed 
urban population belongs to the scheme of blue-collar workers, in other cases they share a 
scheme with farmers. Usually, civil servant schemes offer more favourable conditions than 
blue-collar schemes. Farmers’ schemes frequently face major difficulties in collecting 
revenues and depend on government transfers; these schemes often pay the lowest pensions. 
The general tendency is the integration of these schemes with the exception of some 
professions such as the armed forces. The speed of integration depends largely on 
developments in agriculture, most notably the speed of industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
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Among candidate countries Bulgaria has the lowest rate of non-regular employment in the 
labour market and this is the country that went through the integration process first, 
completing it by 1975 (Müller 2003). Croatia had three separate schemes, those of the 
employees, the self-employed and the farmers, until 1998. In Romania the funds of the 
employees were merged with the farmers’ fund between 1998 and 2001. The social security 
administration still provides separate data, which reveal that benefits paid by the farmers’ 
fund is significantly lower than the benefits in the employees’ fund. The government 
struggled through the 1990s to feed the farmers’ scheme. Before the merger, in 1997, only 2% 
of the revenues were raised from contributions of the farmers (Toma, 2004). Romania has a 
large self-employed population, mainly in agriculture, characterised by low coverage, 
extensive contribution avoidance, poor benefits and difficulties in access to other chapters of 
social security, such as health care. In Turkey nearly half of the employed work under non-
regular conditions. The administration of the three social security funds, those of the civil 
servants, the blue-collars and the self-employed and farmers will be unified in 2007. 
 
Table 7. Effects of the informal economy on the pension system 
 Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania  Turkey 
non-regular employment % 14  21  34  47 
creation of universal 
system 
1975 1999  1998-2001  unified 
administration 
from 2007 
rate of benefit in richest 
and poorest fund 
 -  -  2,5  1,8 
active  contributors  (%)  75 93 48 51 
self-employed among 
active contributors (%) 
7 10 1 na   
covered wage bill   na  41  16   na 
Note: Non-regular employment covers the self-employment, non-paid family workers and daily paid workers. 
Sources: Balkandide country studies, GVG (2003) and ILO (2004). 
 
The labour market parameters strongly correlate with the collection of contributions. The two 
candidate countries with low rates of non-regular employment, Bulgaria and Croatia have 
higher rates of active contribution, 75% and over 90%, respectively. In contrast the two 
countries with extensive subsistence farming and non-regular employment see their 
corresponding rate at around 50%. The data even reveal that urban self-employment, though 
makes the collection of contributions difficult and is easier to accommodate with 
contributions to the social protection system than rural self-employment and other forms of 
non-regular employment. Whereas in Bulgaria and Croatia the self-employed are about 50% 
underrepresented among the contributors (7 and 10%, respectively, of the self-employed 
among the active contributors against 14 and 21%, respectively of the self-employed among 
the employed), the self-employed in Romania do not in effect, contribute to the social 
protection system. 
 
Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the informal economy represents 38.3% of the GDP. There was a declining trend 
after 1996 in the relative proportion of the informal economy largely due to the introduction 
of the currency board in mid-1997, which marked a steady rise in the tax revenues to GDP. 
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boosted the nominal tax revenues at a much faster rate than social compensations, thus 
creating strong incentives for households and businesses to flee from the official economy. 
With macroeconomic stabilisation and the accompanying price and trade liberalisation, the 
informal economy has shrunk subsequently. The process, however, has only been partially 
succeesful as the high tax burden supported by administrative barriers remains the main 
incentive for the existence of the informal economy. After 2000 the share of informal 
economy in the GDP grew again slightly.  
The most common violations are represented by concealment of revenues for the purpose of 
CIT and VAT evasion (including avoidance of VAT registration), VAT draining, illegal 
import and labour related tax and social security contribution evasion (the most prevalent). 
While citizens are better taxpayers, it is believed that through corruption, political links and 
ties with organised crime, large companies manage to maintain impunity. For small and 
medium-size companies creative accounting, revenue concealment and social contributions 
evasion are the most common ways of evading tax obligations. The main reasons for this 
situation, subordinate to the afore-mentioned tax burden level and administrative barriers, are 
the lack of market and tax culture, the lack of trust in the state and marked discontent with the 
quality of the public services. 
A considerable size of the informal economy is quite evenly distributed across sectors. The 
proportion of those employed without a contract in trade, agriculture and construction is the 
most widespread form of shadow activity in the labour market. A majority of companies 
register only a small proportion of wages actually paid in order to avoid social security 
contributions. There is a wide discrepancy between actual salaries and those reported. The 
surveys performed among various businesses show that the firms hide about 34-35% of 
income allocated. 
 
Croatia 
In Croatia, according to different measurement methods, the informal economy declined in 
the second part of the 1990s by a different percentage range. The most optimistic measures 
(Household Budget Surveys) show a decrease of the informal economy from 37% of GDP in 
1993 to 7% in 2000 while some other methods (e.g. monetary evaluation method) claim that 
the informal economy increased somewhat in the second half of the 1990s. Changes in the 
quality and scope of statistics during the past ten years make it difficult to assess the trends in 
informal economy activity with much certainty. The currency demand method puts the share 
of informal economy at around one-third of the GDP, growing slightly in recent past years. 
The 1990-2000 period was marked by several specific factors, which considerably influenced 
economic activity. Issues such as political repression, inadequate legal system, weak 
institutions (e.g. tax and customs administration), administrative control and discretional 
decision-making in the economy, high tax burden, government arrears, sectoral and 
institutional restructuring or significant and frequent changes in the tax system are the main 
problems for developing economies like Croatia preventing economic agents from registering 
their activities. Moreover, the war had serious social consequences. In particular, it created a 
large number of displaced and disabled persons, who needed considerable time to settle and 
fit into the formal environment. 
The Croatian transition intensified sectoral and institutional restructuring. The speed of the 
transition per sector, the development of a number of new, mainly small business units, the 
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resulted in the informal economy reducing in trade, stagnating in agriculture, but rising in 
industry. The transition also created significant changes in the tax system. The majority of 
new tax laws were passed and introduced during the early and mid-1990s when Croatia 
simultaneously had to go through the transition and play a part in the war. Tax authorities had 
to cope with the new taxes and the increased numbers of taxpayers, who took advantage of 
constant changes and lack of organised authorities.  
The reforms in indirect domestic taxes involved a reduction in the general sales tax rate, 
abolition of tax on the sale of raw material and capital goods, the simplification of the 
collection of custom duties and the introduction of excises and value added tax. The reform of 
direct taxes started with the introduction of a new system for taxing income and profit from 
1994 and the opportunity for local government units to introduce surtax for the financing of 
their own expenditure. A reduction in the burden of social security contributions and the 
abolition of some of the contributions resulted in the reduction of the costs of labour in the 
period under observation. The foundation of the Tax Administration and the Financial Police 
at the beginning of the 1990s certainly contributed to more stringent financial discipline 
among taxpayers and put the government’s finances into some order.  
As a part of the National Action Employment Programme, measures have been proposed for 
reducing shadow employment. This is especially oriented towards the widespread 
phenomenon of undeclared cash wages, where the social contribution system loses a huge 
amount of money through tax evasion and workers are worse off. 
 
Romania 
Romania, with its 37.4% share of the informal economy in the country’s GDP has seen an 
increase in the informal economy at an average of 2–2.5% between 1995 and 2003. Although 
the poor and less educated people are the main participants in the informal economy, driven 
by the survival motive (‘subsistence criterion’), richer people are also invited to ‘encouraged’ 
in the informal economy by legislative incoherence, a weak penalty system for fraudulent 
activities and the existence of accompanying effects of the informal economy such as 
bureaucracy or corruption (‘enterprise criterion’). Further to these incentives, people perceive 
taxation as the main cause behind the prevalence of the underground economy. 
Romania is one of the Central and Eastern Europe countries where subsistence farming is a 
severe problem. Subsistence farming is a traditional source of income for Romanian 
households. It reflects rational responses to high levels of urban unemployment, low incomes 
and social security systems (Kostov and Lingard, 2002) and the lack of non-agricultural 
alternatives for employment in rural areas (Chaplin et al, 2004). Subsistence farming can play 
an important role in absorbing labour where alternative sources of employment are scarce. 
The larger the number of people losing their jobs the higher the number of households for 
which self-provisioning has become the main source of livelihood.  During the transition 
period, subsistence farming as practised by the quasi-autocratic households represented a 
survival strategy for families affected by unemployment or by the restructuring of the 
economy. The large extent of subsistence farming in Romania is partly the effect of structural 
reforms in agriculture that have been taking place since 1990.  Their concentration on the 
privatisation of land and downsizing of agricultural enterprises led to the emergence of 
numerous small farms, which were constrained by a lack of necessary assets (Lerman, 1999, 
OECD, 2000). At the same time input and output markets were not adequately restructured 
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producers. This led to an increase in consumption of own goods by the individual farmers and 
to their high subsistence character (Tesliuc, 2000).  
 
Turkey 
In Turkey, high labour taxes, in particular social security charges and stringent regulations 
constitute barriers to the setting up of a formal business and trap firms in the informal 
economy. Turkey’s labour tax wedges are among the most substantial in the OECD, but given 
the large size of the informal sector, government revenues from this source are relatively 
small. It is estimated that if half of the social security charges were cut, additional revenues of 
about 2% GDP would be needed to cover these losses, thus the authorities might, therefore, 
consider funding part of the social security charges on labour through other taxes or efficiency 
gains. The burden is particularly heavy for the firms that employ large numbers of workers at 
minimum wages, such as those operating in regions of high underemployment. Some positive 
changes came about with the enforcement of the new Labour Code, which was adopted in 
2003 and which has eased the burden of regulations on temporary and part-time employment. 
One idea for improved tax collection in developing countries is a tax amnesty. However, as 
the example of Turkey shows, it is rather obvious that frequent tax amnesties hamper tax 
enforcement. Turkey has had 10 tax amnesties since 1963 and 5 social-security amnesties 
since 1983. Their provision included the right to base the payment of past taxes on historical 
values of Turkey’s currency, the lira. In such a way, governments forewent significant 
revenues from such amnesties and, even worse, made ongoing enforcements more difficult, 
since companies waited for the next amnesty before declaring their evasive behaviour.  
The other difficulty with executing tax payments is that developing countries such as Turkey 
have fewer staff to collect and enforce taxes than the developed countries. There are a mere 
0.03 of tax employees per 1,000 of population in Turkey. Late payments of income tax are 
fined at 5% per month. Overall the tax evasion rate is as high as 225% (for every 1 unit of tax 
collected, 2.25 are evaded). Moreover, tax evaders in Turkey often do not feel consequences 
of tax avoidance, since the fine for VAT evasion is less than $20. Better cooperation with 
payment providers and credit companies to raise the quality of data available to tax enforcers 
is one of the ways to improve tax execution. Improvements in the conditions of financing of 
business investment by banks, notably via cuts in financial transaction taxes, would also make 
formalisation more attractive. On the other hand, empowering local governments to enforce 
the rules for registering new businesses, hence collect tax, is another way of improving tax 
payments. In Turkey, most businesses, even informal ones, register mainly because the 
municipal authorities are vigilant about collecting the fees. 
In addition to these issues facing the Turkish economy, there is a discussion over the impact 
of Turkish subsistence farming upon its entry into the European Union. The questions arise 
from the very large numbers of people employed on the land in Turkey, (30% of the 
population), often engaged in very low value added forms of agriculture as compared with 
only 5% in the EU25. If Turkey were to join the EU today it would more than double the 
agricultural population, adding 7.2 million people to the current 6.9 million. 
Agriculture in Turkey has a dual structure with commercial farms and export-oriented chains 
for individual products co-existing alongside subsistence or semi-subsistence farming. 
Agricultural areas are of a fragmented structure and agricultural holdings are generally in the 
form of family enterprises. The latest (2001) Agricultural Census indicates that there are 
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the ten years between 1991 and 2001. The average size of the areas covered by agricultural 
holdings rose to 6 hectares compared to the average 5.4 hectares in the previous census. This 
average size of 6 hectares is well below the EU average of 16.5 hectares per enterprise.  The 
size of the areas possessed by 66% of all agricultural holdings is less than 5 hectares.  Only 
6% of holdings are larger than 20 ha.  
Employment in agriculture, combined with employment status, has a strong impact on the 
probability of someone being registered to one of the three social security funds. 
Approximately half of the employed are not registered. However, this figure is nearly 90% in 
agriculture and about one-third in non-agricultural employment. Daily waged workers and 
non-paid family workers in agriculture are hardly registered at all. By contrast, the registration 
rate among regular wage earners is comparable to levels of NMSs. 
 
Table 8. Employment Status and Registration to Social Security  
   Unregistered (%) 
Total 49 
Salary/Wage earner  23 
Daily Waged  92 
Employer 24 
Self Employed  64 
Non-paid family worker  95 
Agriculture 88 
Salary/Wage earner  52 
Daily Waged  98 
Employer 66 
Self Employed  78 
Non-paid family worker  98 
Non-agriculture 34 
Salary/Wage earner  23 
Seasonal Worker  90 
Employer 21 
Self Employed  50 
Non-paid family worker  80 
Source: Balkandide – Turkey country study. 
 
Despite certain similarities on the surface, such as the relative importance of subsistence 
agriculture and the lack of coverage by institutions of the social protection system, the 
Romanian and the Turkish cases differ. In Romania, subsistence farming saw its revival in the 
last decade after a shock hit the labour market and the government proved unable to build up 
the necessary social protection institutions, including the unemployment services that were 
missing in a centrally-planned economy of nearly full employment. Alternative social 
institutions such as extensive networks based on family or local community of origin are rare. 
In contrast, that part of the Turkish society that has weak links to the labour market and is not 
properly covered by the social protection system had time to build up its alternative 
institutional system such as the hemsehri. BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 35 
 
The hemsehri
15 (hometown organisations) are associations and foundations regrouping people 
from the same place (district, village, town, county, region) as well as migrants from the 
‘Turkish World’, mainly the Balkans and the Caucasus. The emergence of hemsehri is linked 
with the migratory influxes created by rural to urban migration, and since the 1960s, by 
immigration from the ‘Turkish world’ (Hersant and Toumarkin 2005). The hemsehri appeared 
in the 1940 and have grown incessantly since then, even more so since the 1990s. The 
increase in the number of hometown associations during the last decade proves that this 
phenomenon has nothing transient about it and that it constitutes far more than a means of 
integration into the urban environment. By 2004, there would be one association for every 
829 inhabitants, most of these being associations for mosque building. 
The hometown organisations can take two forms: an association (dernek) or a foundation 
(vakıf or property held on trust). The choice of form generally depends upon the resources of 
its founders. Whereas the committee of an association is elected and can be dismissed by its 
members, the executive body of a foundation can comprise one or more founding life-
members, without the requirement of a general meeting. A foundation has greater advantages 
than an association as regards financial matters its general scope of action is more easily 
controlled by its founders than an association and it is more directly in touch with its 
members. As a consequence, there are far fewer foundations than associations. The funding of 
the associations mainly arises through donations. Only those recognised as being of public 
utility can receive state subsidies; the others negotiate financial support – often of a residual 
nature, with town councils.  
The hemsehri is not only a meeting place strengthening pre-existing community solidarity, 
but it is also the point at which political and social networks fuse giving rise to a means of 
communication with the political-institutional system. The hemsehri networks are also 
organised in expatriate communities such as the Turkish communities in Germany (Cagolar 
1995). 
The hemsehri present themselves as the ‘natural’ and democratic expression of local and 
regional identities. Those involved in associations deny all links to local authorities or 
political parties by sheltering behind the label ‘civil society’, which implies independence 
from the state. However, these links are established because they are intrinsic to the 
functioning of the organisations and necessary to the fulfilment of their objectives. In this 
way, the relationship of hometown associations does in fact constitute their connection to 
public life.  
It appears that the division of labour in any given association has a spatial relationship with 
the place where the association has its main offices and its branches. The first type is the 
village association or district branch of a more important organisation, whose members 
originate from a defined geographical area, and live in the vicinity of their association. The 
activities of the association are limited to social activities (picnics, cafés etc.) and to mutual 
aid/assistance. The hemsehri functions as an institution of social cohesion and an alternative 
to state social protection. It represents the network capital of its members; it is frequently 
associated with the ideology of an idealistic community network that never existed in the 
village of origin (Fliche 2005).  
Main offices are relatively well structured and located near the administrative and economic 
centres. A presence in the town centre or close to the areas of economic activity results in 
                                                 
15 Comments from and cooperation with Fikret Adaman, Janusz Oksiejczuk and Rózsa Vidák in writing this 
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contacts with the political and economic authorities. The second type (branch) is the regional 
association, which mobilises small businessmen, politicians, and people of high social 
standing. As for the smaller structures, most of the time they are relegated to the suburbs, and 
have no direct contact with the institutional and economic centres. 
 
2.4 The state of ethnic and religious minorities  
Ethnic and religious diversity is an asset to a society provided the chances of individuals to 
live a full life are not affected by their ethnic or religious background. However, if social 
disadvantages coincide with ethnic or religious tensions, disintegration may threaten the 
development of the society in question. 
The four candidate countries face various ethnic and religious minority issues. In Romania 
and Bulgaria, the Roma are among the largest and most disadvantaged minority groups. 
Bulgaria has another, though less grave issue, the Muslim minority and in particular the 
Turkish minority. In Croatia the Roma population is much smaller, but due to their situation 
and opportunities the Roma issue must be highlighted in Croatia, too. As regards minorities, 
less data are available on Turkey. However a number of sizeable and relevant minorities are 
living in Turkey; the most important minority issue being the social, political and legal status 
of the Kurds.  
 
Social status, living conditions and political representation of the Roma  
According to census data, which are based on self-declaration, the total number of the Roma 
in Central and Eastern- and South-Eastern-Europe (CEE and SEE) is less than 1.5 million. 
Underestimation of the size of disadvantaged minority groups, such as the Roma, by census is 
typical. According to expert estimations the number in question reaches or even exceeds 5 
million (without Turkey) see Table 9. Since there is no current census data for minorities in 
Turkey, the latest such figures were collected in 1965 and were based on spoken languages. 
Table 9. Number and proportion of the Roma population in Central-Eastern- and South-
Eastern-Europe and Turkey by census and estimation (in thousands and %) 
 
Roma population 
by census 
(in thousands)
a) 
Estimation for 
Roma population 
(in thousands)
b) 
Proportion of 
Roma population 
based on 
estimation (%)
b) 
Distribution of the 
Roma population 
in the region by 
country (without 
Turkey)(%)
c) 
Romania 535  1500–2000  7–9  38 
Bulgaria 371  550–800  5–10  14 
Croatia 9  40–100  1–2.5  2 
Turkey
h  – 50–3500  0.001–5  – 
Hungary 190  520–650  5–8  13 
Serbia 108  450–500  6  10 
Slovakia
g)  90 480–520  8–10  10 
Czech Republic  12  175–200  1.7–2  4 
Albania
d)  – 120–150  5  3 
Kosovo 43  100–150  –  3 
Macedonia
f)  54 135  7  3 
Bosnia-Herzegovina
e)  9 50–60  1  1 
Montenegro
g)  3 20–28  4–5  1 
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Sources:  
a) UNDP 2005, except for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Needs Assessment: Roma Education Fund 2005) and Slovakia 
(UNDP 2002). Census data date back to 1991 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, 2001 in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia, 2002 in Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and 2003 in Montenegro. 
b) Needs Assessment: Roma Education Fund (2005); except Slovakia (UNDP 2002) and own calculation based 
on these sources; data applies to 2001–2003, except for Albania. 
c) Own calculation. 
d) ERRC (1997) 
e) ERRC (2004) 
f) Combined with IDPs. 
hKarimova and Deverell (2001) 
 
The largest Roma population in CEE and SEE can be found in Romania, where the most 
reliable expert estimations put their number between 1.5-2.0 million, the lower figure being 
the more likely (Barany 2002), which is 7-9% of the total population. Considered from 
another angle this means that 4 out of 10 CEE and SEE Roma (excluding Turkey) live in 
Romania. Besides Slovakia the highest rate of Roma population within CEE and SEE is in 
Bulgaria, where expert estimates put it close to 10%, implying that around 550–800 thousand 
Bulgarian citizens belong to this minority (Table 9) In Turkey, there are no census data 
available on the Roma population and the range of the estimations varies widely, between 50 
thousands and 3.5 million. The most likely figure is 500 thousand estimated by the European 
Roma Rights Centre (Karimova and Deverell 2001). Due to unreliability we omitted the 
Turkish figures from the total in the table and indeed the analysis below. 
A number of surveys and reports (UNDP 2002, UNDP 2005, Revenga et al 2002, Ringold et 
al 2005) show that in Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia the Roma fall far behind the respective 
national majorities in many aspects of everyday life. In spheres such as education, living 
conditions, housing, income, employment status, poverty, or access to services the Roma 
minorities fare significantly worse than country populations in general, or non-Roma 
neighbours living in close proximity to the Roma population.  
Spatial segregation and language are among the most apparent indicators of the level of 
integration or separation of a minority group. Among the three countries examined here the 
highest share of segregated Roma households (i.e. the proportion of Roma households living 
in a settlement where at least 50% of the population is considered Roma) is in Croatia (46%), 
compared to lower rates in Bulgaria (19%) and Romania (16%). (UNDP, 2005) The minority 
language used in family is another indicator for integration and segregation. Although it is a 
relevant part of the identity and cultural heritage, it is also evident that the within-family 
language can heighten the problem of integration into the majority. In the three candidate 
countries, the majority of Roma predominantly use one of the Roma languages at home: 
slightly more than half of them in Bulgaria and Romania, and nearly three-quarters of them in 
Croatia (UNDP, 2005). According to the two segregation indicators above it is apparent that 
using a Roma language in the family is more frequent than spatial segregation (and it applies 
to almost all CEE and SEE countries). 
In the three countries under examination the Roma population differs from the majority in the 
main demographic trends along several basic indicators such as birth rates (higher than 
average), timing of marriage (earlier than the average), family structure (larger families and 
households) and the age profile (lower rates of Roma among older age groups and higher rates 
among younger age groups) (UNDP, 2002 and UNDP, 2005).  38 | GAL, BERNAT, CELIKEL, GROS, MEDGYESI, PACZYNSI, RADZIWILL, TOTH, WALEWSKI & WOZNIAK 
 
Early marriages are typical for the Roma in the region. For instance in Bulgaria 4 out of 10 
Roma marry before the age 16, 3 of them marry by age 17-18 and 2 between 19-22. As for the 
higher birth rates Roma households have on average 3-4 children in Romania, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, but there are regions where this number can be even higher. 
For instance, in some poorer Slovakian settlements the average number of children is 8 in 
Roma households. According to the fertility rate the same characteristics can be observed: the 
total fertility rate is twice as high (2.6 birth per woman) among the Roma than in the majority 
(1.2 birth per woman) in Romania. Married Roma women have twice as many children (5) as 
non-Roma women (2.2) by the end of their reproductive lives in the Czech Republic. On the 
other hand, life expectancy is significantly lower among the Roma due to their high morbidity 
and infant mortality. The balance is reflected in the gap between the median age of the Roma 
and that of the total population: the median age of the Roma in five Eastern European 
countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) was 19 in 2001, 
while the corresponding figure was almost twice as high, 34 years, for the total population 
(UNDP, 2002). 
There are various consequences of these fundamental demographic characteristics, such as a 
growing proportion of Roma people in the population and a substantial active-age population 
for the coming decades and general increases to the size of Roma population in these 
countries. However, unless the current levels of education of the Roma improves rapidly, 
much of this potential labour force will be unemployable or employed only as unskilled 
labour with low efficiency and low wages. Establishing families at a younger age reduces the 
chance, primarily for girls/women, of staying in the education system for longer. 
The level of education of the Roma is low compared to the EU25-average in general, to the 
majority population of the candidate countries or to the majority population living in close 
proximity to Roma. About 75% of 15 year-olds and older Croatian Roma have 8 years 
elementary schooling as the highest level of education and the situation in the three other 
countries is worse than in Croatia. The corresponding figure is more than 80% in Romania 
and almost 90% in Bulgaria. The share of low-level educated Roma is 2–3 times higher than 
among the neighbouring majority. The same outcome can be observed in the labour market. 
Only 13–21% of Roma aged 15 and above are employed in the three countries, which is a rate 
2–3 times lower than that of the majority population living in close proximity, itself lower 
(35–46%) than the national averages (UNDP, 2005). The lowest levels can be observed in 
Romania, where only one-third of the majority living close to the Roma and slightly more 
than one-tenth of the Roma are active earners among the population of 15 years and above.  
As regards living conditions, about half of Roma people in Bulgaria and two-thirds of them in 
Romania live below the income based absolute poverty line of USD 4.30 at PPP per day per 
capita (UNDP 2005), while the rate of poor non-Roma living in the neighbourhoods of the 
Roma is much lower (6% in Bulgaria and 20% in Romania). Due to higher incomes in general 
the situation in Croatia is better. The share of poor (using the same absolute poverty line) is 
considerably lower both among the Roma and the non-Roma (11% and 2% respectively). The 
living conditions of the Roma are worse than those of the majority population living in their 
neighbourhoods by other indicators, too, such as access to essential drugs, secure housing, 
improved sanitation, improved water sources. 
The low level of social integration is combined with low levels of political representation. 
Roma political parties or Roma MPs represent Roma issues very feebly on a national political 
level, although many well-educated Roma can be found on higher levels of the public 
administration. The Roma are represented principally by NGOs, which focus mainly on the BALKANDIDE: SYNTHESIS REPORT | 39 
 
protection of human rights. Ironically, even such institutions that are dedicated to eliminating 
segregation on ethnic or religious grounds can work against the improvement of the situation 
of the Roma. In particular, the Bulgarian Constitution forbids the establishment of parties on 
an ethnic and religious basis (CEDIME-SE, 2000:8), which weakens the political 
representation of the Roma. Such a representation is further obstructed in Romania by, 
according to expert estimations, 20% of the Roma having no government ID cards. Despite 
this, many Roma people participate in elections in Romania but few vote for Roma parties. 
(NDI, 2003). 
 
Other minority issues in the candidate countries 
An estimated 15–20% of the Turkish population belongs to some ethnic or religious minority. 
These minorities can be broken down into various sub-groups by further ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or other dimensions and there are also overlaps between the communities, thus part 
of Turkish society can be considered as a mosaic of different identities. The most relevant 
minority issue, nevertheless, is the political, legal and social status of Kurds due to their share 
in the entire population (mostly in less developed Eastern and South-Eastern regions), the lack 
of political stability and security and the low level of integration. There is no exact data on the 
number of Kurds, since the Turkish Constitution does not recognise the Kurdish community 
as a national, ethnic or linguistic minority. Official data or estimations on Kurds is not 
available and a wide range of estimations can be found on the number of Kurds, which 
occasionally seem to be contradictory or suggest the unlikely conclusion that almost all 
Turkish citizens who belong to a minority group are Kurdish. These estimations indicate the 
number or share of Kurds in Turkey is between 7–15 million or 13–20% of the Turkish 
population (Mutlu 1996, Karimova and Deverell 2001, Kaya and Baldwin 2004).  
Since no reliable data are available on the number and social status of the Kurds we can only 
rely on indirect evidence. Expert estimate (Mutlu, 1996) suggest that the majority of the 
Kurds are located in the South-Eastern and Eastern regions of Turkey: 2 out of 3 Kurdish 
people in Turkey are living in these regions, which are among the poorest, least developed 
parts of the country with the highest share of agriculture but lowest share of commerce and 
banking in the local economy (National Account Statistics and Population Census, 
TURKSTAT). 
The Muslim population of Bulgaria (usually called Bulgarian Muslims, Bulgaro-
Mohammedans or Pomaks) constitutes a sizeable but heterogeneous group, including several 
ethnic or national minorities besides Pomaks such as Turks, Gypsies and Tatars. These mostly 
Sunni Muslim groups have been living in Bulgaria for centuries. During the cold war, in the 
1960s and 1970s, Bulgarian Muslims were forced to take Bulgarian names. The largest group 
among them are the Turks with almost the same number as the Roma community: about 800 
thousand people, which is roughly 10% of the population. A large part of the Turkish 
minority emigrated to Turkey during the second half of the 1980s as a response to their 
political, legal and social situation. Although their cultural rights were restored after political 
transition, the low standard of living motivates Bulgarian Turks, in particular the young, to 
continue to migrate to Turkey (Petkova, 2002, CEDIME-SE, 1999a, CEDIME-SE, 1999b).  40 | 
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Annex 1.1: Key social indicators per geopolitical entity (latest year)
Nr. Key indicator Unit Year BG CR RO TR
3 Old age dependency ratio % 2005 24.8 24.6 21.1 8.8 Turkey: 2000, Croatia: 2004
4 Crude net migration rate per 1000 
inhab.
2004 0.1 2.6 -0.5 :
5t Youth education attainment level - total % 2005 76.8 93.9 75.2 43.9
5f Youth education attainment level - females % 2005 76.3 94.4 76.4 50.9
5m Youth education attainment level - males % 2005 77.3 93.5 74.1 38.0
6t Lifelong learning - total % 2005 1.2 2.3 1.6 2.0
6f Lifelong learning - females % 2005 1.3 2.3 1.7 2.6
6m Lifelong learning - males % 2005 1.2 2.3 1.5 1.4
7at Employment rate - total % 2005 56.0 55.0 58.4 43.4
7af Employment rate - females % 2005 52.0 48.6 55.1 22.3
7am Employment rate - males % 2005 59.9 61.2 69.5 64.8
7bt Employment rate of older workers - total % 2005 35.4 32.6 37.4 31.0
7bf Employment rate of older workers - females % 2005 24.8 23.8 31.8 17.1
7bm Employment rate of older workers - males % 2005 47.7 43.0 45.8 45.4
8at Unemployment rate - total % 2005 9.8 12.7 7.7 10.3
8af Unemployment rate - females % 2005 9.5 13.0 7.5 10.3
8am Unemployment rate - males % 2005 10.0 11.7 8.0 10.3
8bt Long-term unemployment rate - total % 2005 6.0 7.4 4.4 4.0 Turkey: 2004
8bf Long-term unemployment rate - females % 2005 6.0 8.4 3.9 4.4 Turkey: 2004
8bm Long-term unemployment rate - males % 2005 6.0 6.5 4.7 3.8 Turkey: 2004
9 Expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP % 2005 17.4 23.4 34.6 32.3 Croatia: 2004
10 Old age and survivors benefits as a percentage of total social benefits % 2004 39.7 : : :
11 Public expenditure in active LMP measures as a percentage of GDP % 2005 0.60 0.11 0.12 : Romania: 2004
12 Inequality of income distribution Ratio 2005 3.7 4.5 4.8 9.9 Croatia, Romania: 2004, Turkey: 2003
13at At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers - total % 2004 18 31 22 31 Croatia, Romania, Turkey: 2003
13af At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers - females % 2004 20 33 23 32 Croatia, Romania, Turkey: 2003
13am At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers - males % 2004 15 29 22 29 Croatia, Romania, Turkey: 2003
13bt At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers - total % 2005 14 17 18 26 Croatia, Romania: 2004, Turkey: 2003
13bf At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers - females % 2005 15 18 18 26 Croatia, Romania: 2004, Turkey: 2003
13bm At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers - males % 2005 13 15 18 25 Croatia, Romania: 2004, Turkey: 2003
14at People aged 18-59 living in jobless households - total % 2005 13 12.5 10.4 :
14af People aged 18-59 living in jobless households - females % 2005 13.5 13.6 11.3 :
14am People aged 18-59 living in jobless households - males % 2005 12.6 11.5 9.4 :
14b Children aged 0-17 living in jobless households % 2005 14.5 8.7 10.4 :
15af The percentage of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parlia% 2005 21.0 21.7 11.2 4.4
16 Gender pay gap in unadjusted form % 2004 18 11 14 12 Croatia: 2003, Turkey: 2002
17af Life expectancy at birth - females Years 2005 76.2 79.0 75.1 73.8 Croatia, Romania: 2004
17am Life expectancy at birth - males Years 2005 69.1 72.0 67.7 68.9 Croatia, Romania: 2004
17bf Disability-free life expectancy at birth - females Years 2002 67.1 69.3 65.2 62.8
17bm Disability-free life expectancy at birth - males Years 2002 62.6 63.8 61.0 61.2
18at Serious accidents at work - total Index points 
(1998 = 100)
2003 83 : 111 83
18af Serious accidents at work - females Index points 
(1998 = 100)
2003 : : 117 :
18am Serious accidents at work - males Index points 
(1998 = 100)
2003 : : 111 :
18b Fatal accidents at work Index points 
(1998 = 100)
2003 83 : 111 64Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.2: Key indicators per candidate country
Key indicator 1
BG CR RO TR
Real GDP growth rate (Growth rate of GDP at constant prices (base year 1995). Annual growth rates)
2000 5.4 2.9 2.1 7.4
2001 4.1 4.4 5.7 -7.5
2002 4.9 5.6 5.1 7.9
2003 4.5 5.3 5.2 5.8
2004 5.7 3.8 8.3 8.9
2005 5.5 4.3 4.1 7.4
Key indicator 2
BG CR RO TR
Total population, 1st January  (The number of inhabitants of the area on 1st January (or on 31st December of the previous year))
2000 8,149 4,381 22,435 67,804
2001 7,891 4,440 22,408 68,365
2002 7,846 4,443 21,795 69,302
2003 7,801 4,442 21,734 70,231
2004 7,761 4,442 21,673 71,152
2005 7,718 4,444 21,658 72,065
Key indicator 3
BG CR RO TR
Old age dependency ratio  (Population aged 65 and over as a percentage of the working age population (15-64) on 1st January)
2000 23.8 18.2 19.3 8.8
2001 24.7 23.4 19.6 :
2002 24.9 23.7 20.4 :
2003 24.9 24.2 20.6 :
2004 24.9 24.6 20.9 :
2005 24.8 : 21.1 :
Key indicator 4
BG CR RO TR
Crude net migration rate
2000 : 5.3 -0.2 :
2001 7.3 3.8 0.0 :
2002 -0.1 1.9 -0.1 :
2003 0.0 2.7 -0.3 :
2004 0.1 2.6 -0.5 :
2005 ::::Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 5
BG CR RO TR
Youth education attainment level  (Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education)
Total
2000 74.9 : 75.8 38.9
2001 78.2 : 77.3 40.5
2002 77.5 90.3 75.3 42.8
2003 75.6 90.7 73.8 44.9
2004 76.0 92.5 74.8 41.8
2005 76.8 93.9 75.2 43.9
Females
2000 77.1 : 77.0 46.7
2001 79.7 : 77.3 49.4
2002 80.2 91.7 77.3 52.6
2003 77.4 92.1 74.8 54.4
2004 77.2 93.7 75.8 49.6
2005 76.3 94.4 76.4 50.9
Males
2000 72.8 : 74.5 32.4
2001 76.6 : 77.2 32.8
2002 75.0 88.9 73.1 34.5
2003 73.9 89.5 72.8 37.0
2004 74.8 91.5 73.8 35.1
2005 77.3 93.5 74.1 38.0
Key indicator 6
BG CR RO TR
Life-long learning (adult participation in education and training) (Percentage of the population aged 25-64 participating in education and training over the four weeks prior to the survey))
Total
2000 1.4 : 0.9 1.1
2001 1.3 : 1.1 1.0
2002 1.4 2.1 1.1 0.9
2003 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.2
2004 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.3
2005 1.2 2.3 1.6 2.0
Females
2000 1.4 : 0.8 1.3
2001 1.3 : 1.0 1.3
2002 1.6 2.2 1.0 1.2
2003 1.4 2.1 1.5 1.6
2004 1.1 2.3 1.6 1.6
2005 1.3 2.3 1.7 2.6
Males
2000 1.5 : 1.0 0.8
2001 1.3 : 1.1 0.7
2002 1.2 2.0 1.2 0.6
2003 1.1 2.1 1.1 0.7
2004 1.1 1.8 1.6 0.9
2005 1.2 2.3 1.5 1.4Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 7a
BG CR RO TR
Employment rate (Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population of the same age group)
Total
2000 50.3 : 63.2 46.7
2001 49.7 51.6 62.6 45.6
2002 50.8 53.1 58.0 44.4
2003 52.7 53.2 57.8 43.2
2004 54.0 54.5 57.9 43.7
2005 56.0 55.0 58.4 43.4
Females
2000 46.3 : 61.9 24.9
2001 46.7 44.7 61.1 25.1
2002 47.7 46.7 56.7 25.3
2003 49.2 46.9 55.3 23.9
2004 50.5 47.9 56.2 22.9
2005 52.0 48.6 55.1 22.3
Males
2000 54.6 : 75.4 68.9
2001 52.7 58.9 73.9 66.5
2002 54.0 59.8 70.7 63.9
2003 56.1 59.9 69.6 62.9
2004 57.7 61.3 70.2 64.7
2005 59.9 61.2 69.5 64.8
Key indicator 7b
BG CR RO TR
Employment rate of older workers  (Employed persons aged 55-64 as a percentage of the population of the same age group)
Total
2000 20.3 : 49.5 36.3
2001 24.2 : 48.2 35.8
2002 26.2 24.8 37.7 35.7
2003 31.0 28.4 38.1 33.5
2004 31.8 30.1 36.9 33.2
2005 35.4 32.6 37.4 31.0
Females
2000 10.3 : 43.9 20.8
2001 15.4 : 43.1 21.2
2002 17.8 16.9 33.2 23.3
2003 21.5 20.3 33.6 22.1
2004 23.5 21.0 31.9 20.0
2005 24.8 23.8 31.8 17.1
Males
2000 32.0 : 56.9 52.4
2001 33.8 : 55.3 51.0
2002 36.3 34.2 44.2 48.7
2003 41.2 38.1 44.6 45.4
2004 41.8 40.9 44.9 46.9
2005 47.7 43.0 45.8 45.4Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 8a
BG CR RO TR
Unemployment rate (Unemployed persons as a percentage of the active population)
Total
2000 16.4 16.1 6.8 6.5
2001 19.5 15.8 6.6 8.4
2002 18.1 14.8 7.5 10.3
2003 13.7 14.3 6.8 10.5
2004 12.0 13.8 7.6 10.3
2005 9.8 12.7 7.7 10.3
Females
2000 16.2 17.3 6.3 6.3
2001 18.6 18.1 6.2 7.5
2002 17.3 16.6 7.1 9.4
2003 13.2 15.8 6.3 10.1
2004 11.5 15.7 6.5 9.7
2005 9.5 13.0 7.5 10.3
Males
2000 16.7 15.0 7.2 6.6
2001 20.2 14.2 6.9 8.7
2002 18.9 13.4 7.8 10.7
2003 14.1 13.1 7.2 10.7
2004 12.5 12.2 8.6 10.5
2005 10.0 11.7 8.0 10.3
Key indicator 8b
BG CR RO TR
Long-term unemployment rate  (Long-term unemployed persons (12 months and more) as a percentage of the active population)
Total
2000 9.3 9.1 3.6 1.3
2001 11.9 10.1 3.2 1.7
2002 11.7 8.6 4.5 2.9
2003 8.9 8.6 4.3 2.5
2004 7.1 7.4 4.7 4.0
2005 6.0 7.4 4.4 :
Females
2000 9.1 9.4 3.4 1.8
2001 11.3 12.6 3.0 2.2
2002 11.2 9.9 4.3 3.3
2003 8.6 9.7 4.1 2.9
2004 7.0 9.1 3.8 4.4
2005 6.0 8.4 3.9 :
Males
2000 9.5 9.0 3.8 1.2
2001 12.5 8.1 3.4 1.5
2002 12.2 7.5 4.6 2.8
2003 9.1 7.7 4.5 2.3
2004 7.2 6.0 5.5 3.8
2005 6.0 6.5 4.7 :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 9
BG CR RO TR
Expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP
2000 14.2 19.5 10.4 6.6
2001 13.6 19.0 11.0 7.8
2002 13.5 18.5 10.5 8.0
2003 13.4 17.7 10.4 9.1
2004 17.2 11.5 9.1
2005 9.7
Key indicator 10
BG CR RO TR
Old age and survivors benefits as percentage of total social benefits
2000 42.0 : : :
2001 40.4 : : :
2002 39.4 : : :
2003 40.7 : : :
2004 39.7 : : :
2005 ::::
Key indicator 11
BG CR RO TR
Public expenditure on active LMP measures as a percentage of GDP
(Categories 2-7 excl. 2.4)
2000 0.20 : 0.03 :
2001 0.20 : 0.10 :
2002 0.20 0.04 0.10 :
2003 0.40 0.17 0.16 :
2004 0.60 0.15 0.12 :
2005 0.60 0.11 : :
Key indicator 12
BG CR RO TR
Inequality of income distribution (income quintile share ratio) (The ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income
(lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income.)
2000 3.7 : 4.5 :
2001 3.8 4.3 4.6 :
2002 3.8 4.5 4.7 10.8
2003 3.6 4.4 4.6 9.9
2004 4.0 4.5 4.8 :
2005 3.7 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 13a
BG CR RO TR
At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers  (The percentage of persons with an equivalised disposable income, before social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised
disposable income (after social transfers). Retirement and survivor’s pensions are counted as income before transfers and not as social transfers.).
Total
2000 18 : 21 :
2001 19 : 22 :
2002 17 : 23 31
2003 16 31 22 31
2004 18 : :
2005 : :
Females
2000 19 : 22 :
2001 20 : 23 :
2002 18 : 23 31
2003 18 33 23 32
2004 20 : : :
2005 ::::
Males
2000 16 : 21 :
2001 18 : 22 :
2002 15 : 23 30
2003 14 29 22 29
2004 15 : : :
2005 ::::
Key indicator 13b
BG CR RO TR
At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers  (The percentage of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income.)
Total
2000 14 : 17 :
2001 16 17 17 :
2002 14 18 18 25
2003 14 17 17 26
2004 15 17 18 :
2005 14 : : :
Females
2000 15 : 18 :
2001 17 19 17 :
2002 15 19 18 25
2003 16 18 18 26
2004 17 18 18 :
2005 15 : : :
Males
2000 13 : 17 :
2001 14 15 17 :
2002 12 18 18 25
2003 12 16 17 25
2004 13 15 18 :
2005 13 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 14a
BG CR RO TR
People aged 18-59 living in jobless households
Share of persons/women/men aged 18-59 who are living in jobless households. Students aged 18-24 who live in households composed solely of students of the same age class are not counted neither in the numerator nor in the
denominator.
Total
2000 15.5 : 8.4 :
2001 17.3 : 8.7 :
2002 16.6 14.0 11.3 :
2003 15.3 13.2 11.1 :
2004 13.7 11.2 11.1 :
2005 13.0 12.5 10.4 :
Females
2000 16.3 : 9.3 :
2001 17.8 : 9.6 :
2002 17.0 15.8 12.5 :
2003 15.8 14.4 12.4 :
2004 14.2 12.0 11.7 :
2005 13.5 13.6 11.3 :
Males
2000 14.6 : 7.4 :
2001 16.8 : 7.7 :
2002 16.1 12.2 10.1 :
2003 14.7 12.0 9.8 :
2004 13.2 10.3 10.4 :
2005 12.6 11.5 9.4 :
Key indicator 14b
BG CR RO TR
Children aged 0-17 living in jobless households
Share of persons aged 0-17 who are living in jobless households
2000 : : 7.2 :
2001 19.0 : 6.8 :
2002 18.7 10.3 9.8 :
2003 16.6 10.4 11.2 :
2004 15.6 7.4 11.1 :
2005 14.5 8.7 10.4 :
Key indicator 15a
BG CR RO TR
The percentage of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parliaments
2000 10.8 20.5 7.3 4.2
2001 26.3 20.5 10.7 4.2
2002 26.3 20.5 10.7 4.4
2003 26.3 20.5 10.7 4.4
2004 21.0 17.8 11.2 4.4
2005 21.0 21.7 11.2 4.4Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 16
BG CR RO TR
Gender pay gap in unadjusted form  (Difference between men’s and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of men’s average gross hourly earnings. The population consists of all paid employees aged 16-64 that are ‘at
work 15+ hours per week’)
2000 : : 17 :
2001 23 : 18 :
2002 21 : 17 12
2003 18 11 18 :
2004 18 : 14 :
2005 ::::
Key indicator 17a
BG CR RO TR
Life expectancy at birth (The mean number of years that a newborn child can expect to live if subjected throughout her/his life to the current mortality conditions (age specific probabilities of dying))
Females
1950 ::::
1960 ::::
1970 ::::
1970 ::::
1980 ::::
1990 ::::
2000 75.3 76.7 74.6 72.8
2001 75.3 78.2 74.9 73.0
2002 75.6 78.4 74.9 73.2
2003 75.6 78.2 75.3 73.4
2004 76.2 79.0 75.1 73.6
2005 76.2 : : 73.8
Males
1950 ::::
1960 ::::
1970 ::::
1970 ::::
1980 ::::
1990 ::::
2000 68.2 69.1 67.7 68.1
2001 68.2 71.0 67.6 68.2
2002 68.7 71.2 67.5 68.4
2003 68.7 71.2 67.8 68.6
2004 69.1 72.0 67.7 68.8
2005 69.1 : : 68.9
Key indicator 17b
BG CR RO TR
Disability-free life expectancy at birth, 2002
Females 67 69 65 63
Males 63 64 61 61Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Key indicator 18a
BG CR RO TR
Accidents at work - serious accidents  (Index of the number of serious accidents at work per 100 thousand persons in employment (1998=100))
Total
2000 100 : 106 85
2001 90 : 113 90
2002 84 : 104 84
2003 83 : 111 83
2004 ::::
2005 ::::
Females
2000 : : 101 :
2001 : : 112 :
2002 : : 96 :
2003 : : 117 :
2004 ::::
2005 ::::
Males
2000 : : 109 :
2001 : : 117 :
2002 : : 108 :
2003 : : 111 :
2004 ::::
2005 ::::
Key indicator 18b
BG CR RO TR
Accidents at work - fatal accidents (Index of the number of fatal accidents at work per 100 thousand persons in employment (1998=100))
2000 100 : 103 68
2001 104 : 97 92
2002 85 : 95 75
2003 83 : 111 64
2004 ::::
2005 ::::Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.1: Economy
BG CR RO TR
Gross domestic product at current market prices
2005, Bn Euro 21 31 79 291
GDP growth rates at constant prices (1995)
Annual growth rate. 2003 4.5 5.3 5.2 5.8
Annual growth rate. 2004 5.7 3.8 8.3 8.9
Annual growth rate. 2005 5.5 4.3 4.1 7.4
GDP per head (Index EU-25=100, in PPS)
2000 27 41 25 30
2005 33 47 33 29
GDP per head in Euro
2005 2779 6972 3661 4056
Net national income per head (Index EU-15=100, in Euro)
2005 ::::
Household consumption per head (Index EU-15=100, in Euro)
2005 ::::
Household consumption includes the consumption expenditure of non-profit institutions serving households.
Net saving per head (Index EU-15=100, in Euro)
2005 ::::
Gross compensation per employee (Index EU-15=100, in Euro)
2005 ::::
General government debt (% of GDP)
2003 48.2 52.5 26.9 69.8
2004 40.7 53.5 24.2 63.2
2005 31.9 52.1 21.4 55.7
General government deficit (-) (% of GDP)
2003 0.0 -6.3 -2.3 -8.1
2004 1.7 -4.9 -1.2 -7.1
2005 3.2 -4.5 -0.9 -2.0
Annual inflation rate compared to the same month of the previous year
2003 2.3 : 15.3 25.3
2004 6.1 : 11.9 10.1
2005 5 : 10.1 8.1
12-month average annual inflation rate. 12-month average rate
2005 5.0 3.3 9.1 8.1
Interest rates: 10-year government bond yields. monthly average
2003 ::::
2004 ::::
2005 ::::
Interest rates: 10-year government bond yields. annual average
2003 6.42 : : :
2004 5.25 : : :
2005 3.80 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.2: Population
BG CR RO TR
Total population (1000)
1.1.1960 8,228 : : :
1.1.1980 8,877 : : :
1.1.2000 8,149 4,568 22,435 67,804
1.1.2004 7,761 4,442 21,673 71,152
1.1.2005 7,718 4,444 21,659 71,608
2010, baseline scenario 7,400 4,098 21,300 76,505
2015, baseline scenario 7,100 : 20,900 80,524
2020, baseline scenario 6,800 : 20,300 84,301
2050, baseline scenario 5,100 3,239 17,100 :
Population growth rates (per 1000 population), 2004
Total increase : 0.5 -2.4 :
Natural increase -5.2 -2.1 -1.9 12.9
Net migration : 2.6 -0.5 :
The increase in total population is made up of the natural increase (live births less deaths) and net migration. Net migration is estimated on the basis of the difference between population change and natural increase (corrected net migration).
Population structure (percentage of total), 2004
Total 100 100 100 100
0-19 20.9 22.7 24.3 37.9
20-59 56.5 55.2 56.5 53.7
60-79 19.7 19.5 17.0 :
80 and over 2.9 2.6 2.2 :
Population aged 0-14
2000 (1000s) 1,266 867 4,104 20,220
percentage change. 2000/2015  : -19.2 : :
Population aged 15-24
2000 (1000s) 1,170 595 3,616 :
percentage change. 2000/2015  : -18.8 : :
Population aged 25-54
2000 (1000s) 3,396 1,890 9,438 :
percentage change. 2000/2015  : -3.1 : :
Population aged 55-64
2000 (1000s) 926 538 2,296 :
percentage change. 2000/2015  : 27.9 : :
Population aged 65 and over
2000 (1000s) 1,330 548 2,989 3,859
percentage change. 2000/2015  : 19.4 : :
Population aged 80 and over
2000 (1000s) 184 105 400 :
percentage change. 2000/2015  : 122.9 : :
Population by main group of citizenship, in thousand, 2004
Nationals 7,761.0 4,399.3 21,686.9 :
Non-nationals 2.0 27.7 25.6 :
Croatia: 2001
Population by main group of citizenship, in percentages, 2004
Nationals 99.97 99.40 99.88 :
Non-nationals 0.03 0.60 0.12 :
Croatia: 2001Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
BG CR RO TR
Crude marriage rate (per 1 000 population)
1960 8.8 8.9 10.7 :
1970 8.6 8.5 7.2 :
1980 7.9 7.2 8.2 8.2
1990 6.9 6.0 8.3 :
2000 4.4 4.9 6.1 :
2003 3.9 5.0 6.2 6.8
2004 4.0 5.1 6.6 :
2005    :   
The crude marriage rate is the ratio of the number of marriages to the mean population in a given year.
Total fertility rate
1960 2.31 2.21 2.33 :
1970 2.18 1.83 2.89 :
1980 2.10 1.92 : 4.36
1990 1.81 1.69 1.83 :
2000 1.30 1.40 1.31 2.27
2003 1.23 1.33 1.27 2.20
2004 1.29 1.35 1.29 2.20
2005 1.31 : : :
The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if current fertility rates were to continue.
Percentage of live births outside marriage
1960 8.0 : : :
1970 8.5 5.4 : :
1980 10.9 5.1 : :
1990 12.4 7.0 : :
2000 38.4 9.0 25.5 :
2003 46.1 10.1 28.2 :
2004 48.7 10.4 29.4 :
2005 : : :
Crude divorce rate (per 1 000 population)
1960 1.5 1.2 2.0 :
1970 1.2 1.2 0.4 :
1980 1.5 1.2 1.5 :
1990 1.3 1.2 1.4 :
2000 1.3 1.0 1.4 :
2003 1.5 1.1 1.5 0.7
2004 1.9 1.1 1.6 :
2005 ::::
The crude divorce rate is the ratio of the number of divorces to the mean population in a given year.
Proportion of marriages dissolved by divorce, by marriage cohort (%), 2005
1950 ::::
1960 ::::
1970 ::::
1980 ::::
1984 ::::
Mean marriage duration at divorce by marriage cohort, years, 2005
1950 ::::
1960 ::::
1970 ::::
1980 ::::
1984 ::::Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.3: Education and training
BG CR RO TR
Training enterprises as a percentage of all enterprises by size class, 1999
10-49 employees  24 : 8 :
50-249 employees 34 : 13 :
250 or more employees  62 : 38 :
All size classes  28 : 11 :
Percentage of employees of all enterprises participating in CVT courses by gender, 1999
Total 13 : 8 :
Males 16 : 8 :
Females 9 : 7 :
Hours in CVT courses per participant by economic activity (*), 1999
NACE D 19 : 33 :
NACE G 35 : 31 :
NACE J 20 : 27 :
NACE K 50 : 57 :
NACE O 72 : 45 :
Other 46 : 56 :
Total 35 : 42 :
(*) NACE D: Manufacturing, NACE G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, NACE J: Financial intermediation, NACE K: Real estate, renting and business activities, NACE O: Other community, social and personal
service activities, Other (C, E, F, H, I) Mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas, water; Construction; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, communication.
Percentage of employees in small and large enterprises with and without ‘a joint agreement’ participating in CVT courses, 1999
small - with 25 : 14 :
small - without 4 : 1 :
large - with 31 : 18 :
large - without 12 : 6 :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.4: Labour market
BG CR RO TR
Total employment (thousands)
Total 2003 3166 1536 9155 21150
Total 2004 3264 1563 9103 21700
Total 2005 ::::
Females 2003 1490 686 4166 5972
Females 2004 1533 696 4178 5743
Females 2005 ::::
Males 2003 1676 851 4989 15178
Males 2004 1731 866 4926 15957
Males 2005 ::::
Self-employed in % of total employment
Total 2003 8.5 24.2 46.2 15.6
Total 2004 8.6 23.4 42.0 16.3
Total 2005 8.7 : : 16.4
Females 2003 6.1 23.0 47.0 :
Females 2004 5.9 22.5 41.5 :
Females 2005 6.3 : : :
Males 2003 11.0 25.2 45.5 :
Males 2004 11.1 24.2 42.4 :
Males 2005 10.5 : : :
Part-time workers in % of total employment
Total 2003 2.3 8.5 11.5 6.3
Total 2004 2.4 8.5 10.6 6.9
Total 2005 2.1 10.1 10.2 5.9
Females 2003 2.6 11.2 12.2 12.8
Females 2004 2.7 11.2 11.2 15.3
Females 2005 2.5 13.4 10.5 13.5
Males 2003 1.9 6.3 10.9 3.7
Males 2004 2.1 6.3 10.2 3.9
Males 2005 1.7 7.3 10.0 3.3
Temporary contract workers in % of total employment
Total 2003 6.5 11.3 2.0 :
Total 2004 7.4 12.2 2.5 :
Total 2005 6.4 12.4 2.4 :
Females 2003 6.0 10.7 1.7 :
Females 2004 7.0 12.4 2.0 :
Females 2005 6.2 12.3 1.9 :
Males 2003 7.0 11.8 2.2 :
Males 2004 7.7 12.1 2.9 :
Males 2005 6.7 12.4 2.8 :
Services in % of total employment
Total 2003 57.1 53.4 34.5 47.9
Total 2004 57.2 53.7 37.2 47.7
Total 2005 56.8 : : :
Females 2003 63.6 63.4 37.8 :
Females 2004 64.6 63.9 41.6 :
Females 2005 65.1 : : :
Males 2003 51.1 45.2 31.8 :
Males 2004 50.4 45.5 33.5 :
Males 2005 49.8 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
BG CR RO TR
Industry in % of total employment
Total 2003 32.8 29.8 29.8 18.2
Total 2004 33.1 29.9 31.2 18.3
Total 2005 34.3 : : :
Females 2003 29.1 18.9 24.9 :
Females 2004 28.6 18.6 26.1 :
Females 2005 28.3 : : :
Males 2003 36.9 38.5 33.9 :
Males 2004 37.7 38.9 35.5 :
Males 2005 39.6 : : :
Agriculture in % of total employment
Total 2003 10.1 16.9 35.7 33.9
Total 2004 9.7 16.5 31.6 34.0
Total 2005 8.9 : : :
Females 2003 7.3 17.7 37.3 :
Females 2004 6.7 17.5 32.3 :
Females 2005 6.5 : : :
Males 2003 12.1 16.2 34.4 :
Males 2004 6.7 15.6 31.0 :
Males 2005 10.6 : : :
Total unemployment (thousands)
Total 2003 449.2 329.8 686.5 2,496.3
Total 2004 400.0 309.9 767.3 2,479.3
Total 2005 334.1 308.7 780.5 :
Females 2003 203.3 189.7 290.4 674.3
Females 2004 178.0 180.8 298.4 615.0
Females 2005 151.6 180.8 341.6 :
Males 2003 245.8 140.1 396.0 1,822.0
Males 2004 222.0 129.1 468.9 1,864.3
Males 2005 182.6 127.9 438.9 :
Youth unemployment rate (15 to 24 years)
Total 2003 27.7 35.9 18.5 20.5
Total 2004 27.0 33.4 21.0 19.7
Total 2005 22.8 32.6 21.8 19.3
Females 2003 24.6 38.2 18.7 18.9
Females 2004 26.0 38.3 18.9 18.8
Females 2005 21.2 35.6 20.8 19.3
Males 2003 30.3 34.1 18.3 21.4
Males 2004 27.8 29.7 22.4 20.1
Males 2005 24.0 30.4 22.5 19.3
Very long-term unemployment (24 months or more) in % active population
Total 2003 6.8 6.5 2.7 1.1
Total 2004 5.2 5.7 3.1 2.1
Total 2005 4.3 5.5 2.7 :
Females 2003 6.6 7.4 2.6 1.4
Females 2004 5.2 6.9 2.4 2.3
Females 2005 4.3 6.3 2.3 :
Males 2003 6.9 5.7 2.7 1.0
Males 2004 5.2 4.7 3.7 2.0
Males 2005 4.3 4.9 3.1 :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.5: Social protection
BG CR RO TR
Expenditure on social protection in PPS per head of population, 2005
Total  ::::
Expenditure on social protection per head of population at constant prices (Index 2000=100
2000 100 : : :
2001 106 : : :
2002 113 : : :
2003 125 : : :
2004 138 : : :
2005 148 : : :
Social benefits by group of functions (as a percentage of total social benefits
Old age and survivors benefits
1995 ::::
2005 53.0 : : :
Sickness, health care
1995 ::::
2005 34.0 : : :
Disability
1995 ::::
2005 ::::
Unemployment
1995 ::::
2005 4.4 : : :
Family and children
1995 ::::
2005 8.6 : : :
Housing and social exclusion n.e.c.
1995 ::::
2005 ::::Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
BG CR RO TR
Social benefits by group of functions per head of population at constant prices (Index 2000=100
Total benefits
2001 113 : : :
2003 138 : : :
2005 172 : : :
Old age and survivors benefits
2001 109 : : :
2003 123 : : :
2005 154 : : :
Sickness, health care
2001 111 : : :
2003 160 : : :
2005 198 : : :
Disability
2001 ::::
2003 ::::
2005 ::::
Unemployment
2001 112 : : :
2003 132 : : :
2005 156 : : :
Family and children
2001 156 : : :
2003 179 : : :
2005 223 : : :
Housing and social exclusion n.e.c.
2001 ::::
2003 ::::
2005 ::::
Receipts of social protection by type (as a percentage of total receipts
General government contributions
1995 ::::
2005 7.8 : : :
Employers’ social contributions
1995 ::::
2005 44.4 : : :
Social contributions paid by protected persons
1995 ::::
2005 21.6 : : :
Other receipts
1995 ::::
2005 26.2 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.6: Income, poverty and social exclusion
BG CR RO TR
At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off threshold: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), by age, 2005
Total population 14 18 18 26
..Children 0-15 18 20 25 34
..16-24 16 15 21 26
..25-49 13 13 16 21
..50-64 10 16 13 17
..65+ 18 26 17 21
Romania: 2004, Turkey: 2003
At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off threshold: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), by most frequent activity, 2004
Total population, 16+ 14 18 16 22
..At work 7 9 14 23
....Employed 7 6 3 19
....Self-employed 6 20 24 27
..Unemployed 34 34 30 31
..Retired 15 23 15 7
..Other inactive 17 21 20 22
Croatia, Turkey: 2003
At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off threshold: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), by household type, 2004
Total population 15 17 17 26
1 person hh - Total 34 41 25 15
1 person hh - M  17 35 18 14
1 person hh - F 39 43 28 15
1 person hh <30 yrs  25 : : :
1 person hh 30-64 38 25 : :
1 person hh 65+  39 49 31 22
2 adults no children (at least one 65+)  6 27 13 13
2 adults no children (both <65) 7 12 10 8
Other hh no children 10 10 13 12
Single parent (at least 1 child)  33 34 23 40
2 adults 1 dep.child 12 15 10 10
2 adults 2 dep.children 13 15 14 16
2 adults 3+ dep.children 64 21 38 42
Other hh with dep.children 19 13 22 31
Croatia, Turkey: 2003Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
BG CR RO TR
At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off threshold: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), by accommodation tenure status, 2004
Total population 14 18 : 26
..Owner or rent-free 14 18 17 27
..Tenant 26 22 24 19
Croatia, Turkey: 2003
At-risk-of-poverty cut-off threshold (60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), illustrative values in PPS, 2004
Single person household 2,033 4,131 1,116 1,813
Two-adult, two-children household 4,269 8,675 2,344 3,807
Croatia: 2003, Turkey: 2001
At-risk-of-poverty cut-off threshold (60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), illustrative values in Euro, 2004
Single person household 874 2,441 463 1,021
Two-adult, two-children household 1,835 5,126 972 2,144
Croatia, Turkey: 2003
At-risk-of-poverty gap expressed relative to cut-off threshold (60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), 2004
Total population 19 21 23 31
Croatia, Turkey: 2003
Annual disposable equivalised household income, in PPS, 2002
Median 3,266 : 1,960 3,022
Mean 3,596 : : :
Romania, Turkey: 2001
Share of national equivalised household income by quintile, 2005
Total population 100 100 : :
..bottom quintile 8 8 : :
..2nd quintile 13 13 : :
..3rd quintile 17 17 : :
..4th quintile 22 23 : :
..top quintile 40 38 : :
Croatia: 2002Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.7: Gender equality
BG CR RO TR
Women in regional parliaments, 2005
Number of regions : 21 : :
Number of members : 923 : :
Number of female members : 156 : :
Percentage of female members : 16.9 : :
Women in regional governments (including junior ministers), 2005
Number of regions 9 : : :
Number of members 51 : : :
Number of female members 11 : : :
Percentage of female members 21.6 : : :
Women in local councils, 2005
Number of seats : 7533 : :
Number of seats occupied by women : 853 : :
Percentage of seats occ. by women : 11.3 : :
Local data are incomplete. Due to the huge differences in local level political decision-making data provided are not always comparable.Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.3.8: Health and safety
BG CR RO TR
Percentage of persons aged 16 and over stating that they are hampered in daily activities by any physical or mental health problem, illness, disability or sex, 2006
Total : 27 : :
Males : 24 : :
Females : 30 : :
Percentage of persons aged 65 and over stating that they are hampered in daily activities by any physical or mental health problem, illness, disability or sex, 2006
Total : 53 : :
Males ::::
Females ::::
Percentage of persons aged 16 and over with an above-mentioned problem/illness and who are hampered in their daily activities, 2006
Yes, severely ::::
Yes, to some extent ::::
No : 72 : :
Percentage of persons aged 65 and over with an above-mentioned problem/illness and who are hampered in their daily activities, 2006
Yes, severely ::::
Yes, to some extent ::::
No : 46 : :
Percentage of the population aged 16 and over who feel that their health is bad or very bad, by level of education, 2006
Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education ::::
Upper secondary education ::::
Total tertiary education : 17 : :
Percentage of the population aged 16 and over who feel that their health is bad or very bad, by sex, 2006
Total : 36 : :
Males : 32 : :
Females : 40 : :
Percentage of the population aged 65 and over who feel that their health is bad or very bad, by sex, 2006
Total : 72 : 17
Males ::::
Females ::::
Turkey: 2004
Work accidents per 100 000 employed persons by selected type of activity, 2004, Index (2000 = 100)
Total 56 : : :
Construction 66 : : :
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 63 : : :
Transport, storage and communication 70 : : :
Manufacturing 62 : : :
Hotels and restaurants 44 : : :
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 75 : : :Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
BG CR RO TR
Work accidents per 100 000 employed persons by selected type of activity, 2004
Total ::::
Construction  ::::
Agriculture, hunting and forestry ::::
Transport, storage and communication ::::
Manufacturing ::::
Hotels and restaurants ::::
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs ::::
Work accidents per 100 000 employed persons by sex, 2005, Index (1998=100)
Males ::::
Females ::::
Work accidents per 100 000 employed persons by sex, 2005
Males ::::
Females ::::
Number of persons killed in road accidents
2005 957 753 2,499 5,510
Croatia: 2003, Romania, Turkey: 2000
Number of persons killed in road accidents per million inhabitants
2005 124 170 111 81
Croatia: 2003, Romania, Turkey: 2000Annex 1 | Social Situation Report
Annex 1.4: Symbols, country codes
Symbols
Symbols used in the tables
: "not available"
Other symbols
% percent
Country codes
BG Bulgaria
CR Croatia
RO Romania
TR TurkeyAbout ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Bratislava, Slovakia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
SSB    Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway 
SFI    Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
ENEPRI  publications include three series: Research Reports, which consist of papers presenting the 
findings and conclusions of research undertaken in the context of ENEPRI research projects; Working 
Papers, which constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and already published by 
ENEPRI partner institutes on their own account; and thirdly, Occasional Papers (closed series) containing 
a synthesis of the research presented at workshops organised during the first years of the network’s 
existence. 
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Place du Congrès 1 ▪ 1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: 32(0) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: 32(0) 219.41.51 
Website: http//:www.enepri.org ▪ E-mail: info@enepri.org 
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